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This article develops a liberal theory of cultural rights that must 
be guaranteed by just legal and political institutions. People form their 
own individual conceptions of the good in the cultural space constructed by 
the political societies they inhabit. This article argues that only rarely do 
individuals develop views of what is valuable that diverge more than slightly 
from the conceptions of the good widely circulating in their societies. In order 
for everyone to have an equal opportunity to autonomously form their own 
independent conception of the good, rather than merely following others, 
culture must be democratically controlled. Equal respect for members of a 
liberal democracy requires that all citizens have roughly equal opportunities 
to do things like make movies, publish novels, and exhibit paintings. This 
article contends that the contemporary American legal order fails to guarantee 
that all citi]ens haYe roXJhly eTXal oSSortXnities to shaSe and inÁXence their 
shared culture. Guaranteeing the liberty to do so would require reforms to 
many areas of law, including applying anti-discrimination law more broadly 
to the conduct of cultural organizations, expanding fair use protections in 
copyright law, limiting the ability of businesses to arbitrarily refuse service to 
customers, and restricting private control of capital in order to democratize the 
means of cultural production.
INTRODUCTION
When, in 2016, for the second year in a row, exclusively white 
actors were nominated for Oscar awards, protests erupted on social 
Pedia and SroPinenW acWors and filPPakers announced WKaW WKey 
would boycott the Academy Awards ceremony.1 The #OscarsSoWhite 
protests did not argue that the First Amendment free speech rights 
of minority actors and directors had been abridged. Legally, minority 
actors and directors have the same rights as white directors to go 
out and make movies. The complaint of #OscarsSoWhite was that 
PinoriWy acWors and filPPakers cannoW use WKeir rigKWs Wo wriWe and 
sSeak and creaWe culWure as effecWiYely as wKiWe acWors and filPPakers 
can. MinoriWy filPPakers do noW KaYe eTual access Wo +ollywood 
gatekeepers. 
The argument of #OscarsSoWhite seems political in nature, 
1 See Tim Gray, Academy Nominates All White Actors for Second Year in Row, 
VƏƠƗƓƢƧ (Jan. 14, 2016, 7:16 AM), http://variety.com/2016/biz/news/oscar-
nominations-2016-diversity-white-1201674903/ (discussing #OscarsSoWhite 
protests on social media); David Ng, Spike Lee and Jada Pinkett Smith to Boycott 
Oscars; Academy Responds, LſAſ 7ƗƛƓơ (Jan. 18, 2016, 7:50 PM), http://www.
latimes.com/entertainment/movies/moviesnow/la-et-spike-lee-to-boycott-
oscars-html-20160118-htmlstory.html (discussing boycotts of the Academy 
Awards Ceremony).
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even though it is not about First Amendment rights or state action. 
#OscarsSoWhite protests are about systemic racism, but they are 
also about cultural elites refusing to let a diversity of approaches 
Wo filP and sWoryWelling inWo WKeir SresWigious insWiWuWions and 
about a failure of citizens to regard one another as equally capable 
of contributing to their shared culture. Some of the moral force of 
#OscarsSoWhite protests may be about employment discrimination, 
buW WKe Iorce oI WKe SroWesW is noW confined Wo Iairness in ePSloyPenW. 
EYen iI counWerIacWually PinoriWy acWors and filPPakers could find 
work in +ollywood as easily as wKiWe acWors and filPPakers and 
even if winning Academy Awards were unimportant for the career 
SrosSecWs oI acWors and filPPakers iW would sWill be Wroubling Ior WKe 
Oscars to honor only white people. The trouble is that the whiteness 
of the Oscars signals that not all members of our society are, in the 
words of W.E.B. Du Bois, “co-worker[s] in the kingdom of culture.”2 
Liberal political philosophers have debated at length how 
citizens should treat one another as participants in politics, focusing 
on rights of political participation and reciprocity in describing the 
conditions of democratic legitimacy.3 These philosophers have paid 
less attention to what obligations of justice arise from citizens’ 
participation in cultural activity.4 This article contends that rights of 
2 WſEſ%ſ Dƣ %ƝƗơŽ 7ƖƓ SƝƣƚơ ƝƔ %ƚƏƑƙ FƝƚƙƌ EơơƏƧơ ƏƜƒ SƙƓƢƑƖƓơ 4 
(8th ed. 1909).
3 See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32 3ƖƗƚſ ż 3ƣƐſ AƔƔſ 2, 26–
29 (2004).
4 See, e.g., JƝƖƜ RƏƥƚơŽ JƣơƢƗƑƓ Əơ FƏƗƠƜƓơơƌ A RƓơƢƏƢƓƛƓƜƢ 43–44 
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (arguing that “[i]n all parts of society” there should be 
“roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly 
motivated and endowed” but excluding “prospects of culture” from the 
eTual basic liberWies SroWecWed by WKe le[ically Srior firsW SrinciSle oI MusWice. 
In contrast with the emphasis on political liberties and the distribution of 
economic goods that take center stage in much contemporary liberal political 
philosophy, scholars of law and aesthetics who study free speech, copyright, 
intellectual property, remixes, and internet culture have increasingly argued 
that it is important for liberal democracies to promote and protect not just a 
democratic system of politics but also a democratic culture. See Oren Bracha 
& Talha Syed, %eyond (űciency &onseTXence6ensitiYe 7heories of &oSyriJht, 29 
%ƓƠƙƓƚƓƧ 7ƓƑƖſ LſJſ 229, 232 (2014). This article builds on the work of 
legal scholars who have developed theories that focus, among other things, 
on the satisfaction of cultural conditions necessary for the exercise of human 
caSabiliWies or Ior KuPan ÁourisKing see William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing 
the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 +ƏƠƤſ Lſ RƓƤſ 1659, 1746–50 (1988), how to 
politically design an attractive culture, see Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and 
Democratic &XltXre A 7heory of )reedom of ([Sression for the ,nformation 6ociety, 79 
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cultural participation and reciprocity also matter for a constitution’s 
legiWiPacy. SSecifically a legiWiPaWe dePocracy PusW ensure WKaW all 
citizens have a fair, roughly equal opportunity to shape their shared 
culture. Satisfying this requirement in the United States requires 
extensive changes to contemporary public and private law.5
Part I describes the philosophical argument for the norm that 
legitimate democracies must ensure that all citizens have roughly 
eTual oSSorWuniWies Wo inÁuence WKe SoliWical Srocess. &iWi]ens oI a 
democracy remain free and equal by mutually committing to an ideal 
of political equality, so that each person is both ruled and a participant 
in ruling.6 In legitimate democracies, citizens equally share the 
burdens of living together in a community and regard one another as 
political equals, respecting one another’s rights to participate in the 
dePocraWic Srocess by YoWing and Kolding oűce.7 Liberal legitimacy 
also requires that citizens take one another seriously as contributors 
to political dialogue.8 For instance, a society in which everyone had 
an unTuesWioned rigKW Wo YoWe and run Ior oűce buW wKere Pen 
made up their minds in advance that they would not seriously 
entertain any political arguments advanced by women could not be 
a legitimate democracy, for the members of such a society would 
fail to equally share the burdens and opportunities that come from 
living together in a community.
In describing the liberal argument for rights of political 
participation, this article focuses on John Rawls’s argument that 
the “fair value” of the “equal political liberties” must be guaranteed 
to all citizens.9 Rawls’s argument provides a useful starting point 
1ſ<ſ8ſ Lſ RƓƤſ 1, 3–4 (2004), what conditions must hold for individuals to 
act and express themselves autonomously, see Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and 
%eneÀts 7orts, 5estitXtion, and ,ntellectXal ProSerty, 21 Jſ LƓƕƏƚ SƢƣƒſ 449, 469–
  and Kow law affecWs a socieWy·s SoliWical culWure see Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 <ƏƚƓ LſJſ 283, 285 (1996).
5 In this article, the term “citizens” is used to denote equal participants in 
a scheme of political cooperation. However, the obligations and rights of 
reciprocity likely extend beyond those members of existing political societies 
who are presently accorded legal citizenship. See Sarah Song, 7he 6iJniÀcance of 
Territorial Presence and the Rights of Immigrants, in MƗƕƠƏƢƗƝƜ ƗƜ 3ƝƚƗƢƗƑƏƚ 
7ƖƓƝƠƧƌ 7ƖƓ EƢƖƗƑơ ƝƔ MƝƤƓƛƓƜƢ ƏƜƒ MƓƛƐƓƠơƖƗƞ 225, 233–34 
(Sarah Fine & Lea Ypi eds., 2016); see also Sarah Song, Democracy and Noncitizen 
Voting Rights, 13 &ƗƢƗƨƓƜơƖƗƞ SƢƣƒſ 607, 608–11 (2009).
6 See JƝƖƜ RƏƥƚơŽ 3ƝƚƗƢƗƑƏƚ LƗƐƓƠƏƚƗơƛ 4–6 (expanded ed. 2005).
7 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 191–92.
8 Id. at 91.
9 Id. at 149.
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for theorizing about cultural rights for two reasons. First, Rawls’s 
theory of justice provides a compelling and generative account of 
why the fair value of the political liberties matters for the legitimacy 
of a constitution.10 Second Kis PeWKod oI ´reÁecWiYe eTuilibriuPµ 
wKicK works back and IorWK beWween our MudgPenWs abouW sSecific 
cases and our general philosophical judgments about ethics until we 
reacK MusWified conclusions is SarWicularly well suiWed Ior eYaluaWing 
the concrete legal reforms needed to make a constitution legitimate.11 
After describing the rationale for ensuring that all citizens 
have a fair, roughly equal chance to participate in politics in Part I, 
Part II argues that anyone who accepts a guarantee of the fair value of 
the political liberties as a condition of democratic legitimacy should 
also embrace a guarantee of cultural liberties. In a just society with 
a legitimate constitution, rights of cultural participation must be 
insulaWed IroP WKe disWorWing effecWs oI wealWK social Sower and 
SersisWenW bias. %ecause culWure is wKere ciWi]ens figure ouW wKo 
they are and what they value in conversation with one another, 
the urgency of cultural liberties is so great that their fair value is 
a constitutional essential. To be morally legitimate, a constitution 
must guarantee that all similarly talented and motivated citizens have 
rougKly an eTual cKance Wo sKaSe and inÁuence WKe culWure in wKicK 
they live, just as they must have a roughly equal chance to shape and 
inÁuence WKe goYernPenW·s laws and Solicies.12 When some citizens 
can inÁuence WKe culWural liIe oI a socieWy Pore WKan oWKers siPSly 
because of their wealth, racial or sexual privilege, or membership 
in elite cultural networks, equality of citizenship is undermined. 
,I oYerwKelPingly wKiWe AcadePy Awards reÁecW a resWricWion oI 
culWural inÁuence Wo SeoSle wKo KaYe racial or econoPic SriYilege 
WKen WKe condiWions oI liberal legiWiPacy KaYe noW been saWisfied. 7o 
diagnose and identify remedies for these failures of equal citizenship, 
this article develops a theory that I call semiotic justice because it 
focuses attention on how obligations of justice apply to collective 
practices of meaning-making.13
10 See Frank I. Michelman, Justice as Fairness, Legitimacy, and the Question of Judicial 
5eYieZ A &omment, 72 FƝƠƒƖƏƛ Lſ RƓƤſ 1407, 1417–18 (2004); see also 
Frank I. Michelman, ,n PXrsXit of &onstitXtional :elfare 5iJhts 2ne 9ieZ of 5aZls· 
Theory of Justice, 121 8ſ 3Əſ Lſ RƓƤſ 962, 990–91 (1973).
11 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 29–32.
12 Whether such constitutional provisions would need to be judicially enforceable 
is a separate question. For a discussion of this issue, see infra note 117.
13 ´SePioWic MusWiceµ Podifies JoKn Fiske·s SKrase ´sePioWic dePocracy.µ See 
JƝƖƜ FƗơƙƓŽ 7ƓƚƓƤƗơƗƝƜ &ƣƚƢƣƠƓ 236–39 (1987) (arguing that television 
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Guaranteeing the fair value of cultural liberties—ensuring 
that similarly endowed and motivated citizens have roughly the 
same chance to shape the culture in which they live—has broad 
implications for the interface of a society’s political structure and its 
cultural order, giving rise to obligations related to anti-discrimination 
law, free speech law, copyright and property entitlements, and 
the state action doctrine. Because the fair value of liberties to 
SarWiciSaWe in culWure can be guaranWeed wiWK Pany differenW legal 
arrangements, the implications of semiotic justice for law and policy 
are most clearly illustrated by considering failures to ensure the 
fair value of the cultural liberties. Part III of this article considers 
several such failures: the whiteness of the Academy Awards, the 
ability of incumbent artists to use copyright to block the creation of 
appropriation art, and the ability of business owners to arbitrarily 
refuse to serve customers. 
In response to these violations of the fair value of the cultural 
liberties, semiotic justice suggests that the state must organize its 
economic system so that citizens have free time to participate in 
culture, adequately fund public schools and universities so that 
citizens can acquire the skills they need to express their beliefs 
about the good life, narrow the scope of property rights to prevent 
the wealthy from turning economic power into cultural control, 
and provide public funding for the arts and humanities.14 The fair 
value of liberties of cultural participation are among the equal basic 
liberties that must be guaranteed in a legitimate democratic society.
I. RAWLS’S JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS AND THE FAIR VALUE OF THE 
POLITICAL LIBERTIES
John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness has served as the 
fosters a “semiotic democracy” through its playfulness); see also WƗƚƚƗƏƛ 
Wſ FƗơƖƓƠ ,,,Ž 3ƠƝƛƗơƓơ ƢƝ KƓƓƞ 28–31 (2004) (deploying the phrase 
“semiotic democracy” in a theory of intellectual property).
14 Many of these reforms are already suggested by Rawls’s guarantee of the 
fair value of the political liberties or by the requirements of fair equality of 
opportunity, but semiotic justice goes beyond the reform agenda contained 
in Rawls’s political liberties because it puts the fair value of cultural liberties 
on a level with the value of formal equal basic liberties. See generally Seana 
ValenWine SKiffrin Race, Labor, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, 72 
FƝƠƒƖƏƛ Lſ RƓƤſ 1643, 1644 (2004). In this respect, my argument in this 
arWicle Kas a close aűniWy Wo Seana SKiffrin·s arguPenW WKaW WKe Iair eTualiWy oI 
opportunity should be “elevat[ed] . . . to a higher level of priority” in Rawlsian 
theory. Id. at 1644.
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Iocal SoinW Ior PucK liberal SoliWical SKilosoSKy in WKe SasW fiYe 
decades and provides a prominent example of contemporary liberal 
thought about how citizens can live together as equal members of 
a democratic society.15 7Kis 3arW brieÁy seWs ouW Rawls·s WKeory oI 
justice as fairness and explores why Rawls believes that a legitimate 
democracy must guarantee the fair value of the political liberties to 
its citizens. 
For Rawls, the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation 
is “[t]he most fundamental idea in [the] conception” of justice as 
fairness.16 This idea has, for Rawls, three essential features. First, 
social cooperation is more than mere activity coordinated by the 
dictates of a central government. Social cooperation is “guided by 
publicly recognized rules and procedures which those cooperating 
accept as appropriate to regulate their conduct.”17 Second, social 
cooperation is marked by a commitment to reciprocity, including “the 
idea of fair terms of cooperation” that everyone could “reasonably 
accept, and sometimes should accept, provided that everyone else 
likewise accepts them.”18 Third, social cooperation includes the idea 
WKaW SarWiciSanWs Sursue WKeir ´raWional adYanWageµ wKicK sSecifies 
what the social cooperators “are seeking to advance from the 
standpoint of their own good.”19
Society regarded as a fair system of cooperation is composed 
of free and equal persons who have two fundamental “moral powers”:
(i) One such power is the capacity for a sense of 
justice: itis the capacity to understand, to apply, and 
to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the 
principles of political justice that specify the fair 
terms of social cooperation.
(ii) The other moral power is a capacity for a 
conception of the good: it is the capacity to have, to 
revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the 
good. SucK a conceSWion is an ordered IaPily oI final 
ends and aiPs wKicK sSecifies a Serson·s conceSWion 
15 See Henry S. Richardson, John Rawls (1921–2002), ,ƜƢƓƠƜƓƢ EƜƑƧƑƚƝƞƓƒƗƏ 
ƝƔ 3ƖƗƚſ, http://www.iep.utm.edu/rawls (last visited Mar. 27, 2019).
16 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 5.
17 Id. at 6.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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of what is of value in human life or, alternatively, 
of what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life. The 
elements of such a conception are normally set within 
and interpreted by, certain comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrines in light of which the 
various ends and aims are ordered and understood.20
These powers are not momentary but instead are realized over the 
course of a full life.21 
To illustrate the political meaning of the two moral powers, 
Rawls constructs a thought experiment, which he calls the original 
position.22 Hypothetical representatives of citizens who wish to 
come together to form a political society meet in the original 
position to agree on a conception of justice. In the original position, 
these trustees are situated behind a “veil of ignorance” and “are not 
allowed to know the social positions or the particular comprehensive 
doctrines of the persons they represent,” although they know “the 
general commonsense facts of human psychology and political 
sociology.”23 
Within the original position, and given the conception 
of persons as having the two moral powers, Rawls argues that 
the representatives will select two principles of justice to guide 
constitution-making, legislating, and adjudication:
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim 
to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, 
which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all; and
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy 
Wwo condiWions firsW WKey are Wo be aWWacKed Wo oűces 
and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to 
WKe greaWesW benefiW oI WKe leasWadYanWaged PePbers 
oI socieWy WKe difference SrinciSle.24
20 Id. at 18–19.
21 Id. at 19.
22 Id. at 14.
23 Id. at 15, 101.
24 Id. aW ². 7Ke difference SrinciSle Peans WKaW ´ unless WKere is a disWribuWion 
WKaW Pakes boWK Sersons beWWer off . . . an eTual disWribuWion is Wo be SreIerred.µ 
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These principles are lexically ordered, meaning that the basic liber-
Wies guaranWeed by WKe firsW SrinciSle cannoW be Wraded off Wo SroYide 
Pore PaWerial goods eYen Wo WKe worsW off SursuanW Wo WKe second 
principle.25 Political power can only be legitimately exercised in a 
liberal democracy when it is exercised in accordance with “a consti-
tution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may rea-
sonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason,” where the constitution-
al essenWials include WKe firsW SrinciSle oI MusWice along wiWK a ´social 
minimum providing for the basic needs of all citizens.”26
The basic liberties are those liberties that are essential to 
providing the political and social conditions necessary for free and 
equal persons to develop and exercise the two moral powers.27 
Rawls divides up the basic liberties into two categories. First, there 
are those that “enable citizens to develop and exercise [the moral] 
powers in judging the justice of the basic structure of society and its 
social policies,” which are “the equal political liberties and freedom 
of thought.”28 Second, there are those liberties that “enable citizens 
to develop and exercise their moral powers in forming and revising 
and in rationally pursuing (individually or, more often, in association 
with others) their conceptions of the good.”29 Thus, securing the 
basic liberties should ensure that people who participate in a project 
of social cooperation can realize the two moral powers. Cooperators 
would not give up these basic liberties, or even risk doing so, because 
of the centrality of the moral powers to the conception of the person 
that Rawls presupposes.30
Rawls·s difference SrinciSle Pay allow Ior significanW social 
and economic inequality, provided that such inequality is to the 
adYanWage oI WKe leasW well off.31 There is a risk that such inequalities 
might distort equal access to the public political forum, turning 
WKe SoliWical liberWies guaranWeed by WKe firsW SrinciSle inWo ePSWy 
formalities. For instance, if everyone had the same right to political 
speech but only a few could spend great sums on political campaigns, 
JƝƖƜ RƏƥƚơŽ A 7ƖƓƝƠƧ ƝƔ JƣơƢƗƑƓ 76 (1971).
25 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 43.
26 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 6, at 137, 228–29.
27 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 45.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 102.
31 Id. at 158; see also SKiffrin supra note 14, at 1647.
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the liberty of free political speech would be worth more to wealthy 
citizens than to the poor.32
To prevent the equal political liberties from becoming 
ePSWy IorPaliWies Rawls describes Kis firsW SrinciSle as including 
a “proviso” according to which “the fair value of the equal political 
liberties” (and only these liberties) must be guaranteed to every 
citizen.33 This proviso responds to the objection that the equal 
liberties in a modern state are merely formal: 
[T]he worth of the political liberties to all citizens, 
whatever their economic or social position, must 
be suűcienWly eTual in WKe sense WKaW all KaYe a Iair 
oSSorWuniWy Wo Kold Sublic oűce and Wo affecW WKe 
outcome of elections and the like . . . . The requirement 
of the fair value of the political liberties . . . is part of 
the meaning of the two principles of justice.34
Rawls reasons that the proviso “secures for each citizen a fair and 
roughly equal access to the use of a public facility designed to serve 
a definiWe SoliWical SurSose naPely WKe Sublic IaciliWy sSecified by 
the constitutional rules and procedures which govern the political 
process and control the entry into positions of political authority.”35 
AddiWionally Rawls concedes WKaW WKe difference SrinciSle is by iW-
selI insuűcienW Wo SreYenW WKe disWorWion oI WKe Yalue oI WKe eTual 
political liberties. The “public facility” of political institutions has 
“limited space,” and “[w]ithout a guarantee of the fair value of the 
political liberties, those with greater means can combine together 
and exclude those who have less. . . . The limited space of the public 
political forum . . . allows the usefulness of the political liberties to 
be far more subject to citizens’ social position and economic means 
than the usefulness of other basic liberties.”36 
For Rawls, the guarantee of the fair value of political liberties 
32 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 6, at 358; see also Norman Daniels, Equal Liberty and the 
Unequal Worth of Liberties, in RƓƏƒƗƜƕ RƏƥƚơ 253, 254–58 (Norman Daniels 
ed., 1975); Liam Murphy, :hy Does ,neTXality 0atter 5eÁections on the Political 
0orality of PiNetty·s &aSital in the 7Zenty)irst &entXry, 68 7ƏƦ Lſ RƓƤſ 613, 615–
16 (2015) (“[T]he power that comes with great wealth, especially, seems to 
have a force in political life that no kind of legal regulation is likely to undo.”).
33 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 6, at 149.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 150.
36 Id.
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suggests that Buckley v. Valeo, in which the Supreme Court struck down 
limits on campaign expenditures in favor of individual candidates 
as contrary to the First Amendment,37 violates justice as fairness. 
Buckley “seems to reject altogether the idea that Congress may try to 
establish the fair value of the political liberties” by limiting wealthy 
ciWi]ens· use oI econoPic clouW Wo inÁuence WKe SoliWical Srocess.38
Guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties does not 
require that every single citizen have an equal chance of becoming 
president, that democracies conduct elections by lot, that every 
citizen should be equally provided with airtime on television to 
express their political views, or that the state handicap particularly 
eloquent political speakers to keep all citizens’ chances of attaining 
SoliWical oűce rougKly eTual. GuaranWeeing WKe Iair Yalue oI WKe 
political liberties ensures that “citizens similarly gifted and motivated 
KaYe rougKly an eTual cKance oI inÁuencing WKe goYernPenW·s Solicy 
and of attaining positions of authority irrespective of their economic 
and social class.”39 Rawls means that citizens who are equally gifted 
and PoWiYaWed aW SoliWics PusW KaYe an eTual cKance Wo inÁuence 
Solicy and aWWain Sublic oűce. GuaranWeeing WKe Iair Yalue oI WKe 
political liberties insulates a democracy’s political life from non-
SoliWical inÁuences and guards againsW SoliWical ouWcoPes WKaW reÁecW 
inequalities of wealth or status rather than citizens’ considered 
judgments about how best to achieve justice.
Rawls insists that the fair value of the equal political 
liberties extends only to the equal political liberties and no further, 
because securing the fair value of all of the basic liberties would be 
´eiWKer irraWional or suSerÁuous or socially diYisiYe.µ40 If such a 
requirement meant “that income and wealth are to be distributed 
equally,” the requirement would be irrational because it would 
“not allow society to meet the requirements of social organization 
and eűciency.µ41 If, on the other hand, such a condition would 
require that “a certain level of income and wealth is to be assured 
to everyone in order to express their ideal of the equal worth of 
WKe basic liberWiesµ WKen iW would be suSerÁuous.42 This is both 
because WKe difference SrinciSle reTuires WKe basic sWrucWure Wo be 
37 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
38 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 6, at 360.
39 Id. at 358.
40 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 150–51.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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arranged in a way that will guarantee that every individual has the 
greaWesW leYel oI wealWK Sossible consisWenW wiWK WKe firsW SrinciSle 
of justice and the fair equality of opportunity,43 and because a “social 
minimum” is among the constitutional essentials.44 On the other 
hand, if guaranteeing the fair value of the basic liberties “means that 
income and wealth are to be distributed according to the content 
of certain interests regarded as central to citizens’ plans of life, for 
example, religious interest, then it is socially divisive.”45 Allocating 
extra social resources to citizens who claim religious needs to erect 
PagnificenW WePSles would YiolaWe MusWice as Iairness.46 Thus, Rawls 
concludes that while the equal political liberties must provide all 
ciWi]ens rougKly eTual cKances Wo inÁuence Sublic Solicy and Kold 
Sublic oűce sucK a reTuirePenW cannoW be e[Wended Wo WKe oWKer 
basic liberties.
II. CULTURAL LIBERTIES AND SEMIOTIC JUSTICE
Rawls argues that a legitimate constitution in a just society 
must ensure that rights of political participation are insulated 
IroP WKe disWorWing effecWs oI Poney and social Sower.47 The formal 
political liberties must be guaranteed their “fair value” for all citizens 
in a democracy so that “all have a fair opportunity to hold public 
oűce and Wo affecW WKe ouWcoPe oI elecWions and WKe like.µ48 In this 
Part, I argue that a just democracy must ensure that all citizens have 
a real chance to participate in the cultural life of their community 
and must protect citizens from having their views about the shape 
of their shared culture disregarded by other citizens for reasons that 
have nothing to do with what any individual citizens think culture 
sKould look like or WKaW Perely reÁecW uneTual allocaWions oI culWural 
capital.49
The political liberties are the subset of the equal basic 
liberties that are concerned with political participation, like the right 
43 See id.
44 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 6, at 228–29.
45 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 151.
46 See id.
47 See id. at 150.
48 Id. at 149.
49 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in RƓƏƒƗƜƕơ ƗƜ EƑƝƜƝƛƗƑ 
SƝƑƗƝƚƝƕƧ 280, 282–86 (Nicole Woolsey Biggart ed., 2002) (describing 
cultural capital as a variety of capital that takes the form of dispositions of 
mind and body acquired through education and which can be institutionalized 
WKrougK IorPal credenWials sucK as acadePic TualificaWions.
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to vote and the right to participate in political debates.50 The cultural 
liberties are the subset of the equal basic liberties that enable citizens 
to participate in shaping their culture, like the right to contribute to 
artistic expression and to share one’s views about what a good life 
looks like. Just as guaranteeing the fair value of political liberties is 
necessary Ior WKe deYeloSPenW and e[ercise oI WKe firsW Poral Sower 
(the capacity for a sense of justice), it is necessary to guarantee the 
fair value of cultural liberties to ensure that people can develop and 
exercise the second moral power (the capacity for a conception of 
the good). I designate my theory of the fair value of the cultural 
liberties semiotic justice. Relying on arguments drawn from literary 
and cultural theory, I argue that the ability to participate in shaping 
what a culture looks like is a necessary element of expressing and 
developing one’s own conception of the good, and I argue that many 
of the reasons that it is important to guarantee the fair value of 
the political liberties apply to cultural liberties as well. Ultimately, 
the urgency of cultural liberties is so great that their fair value is a 
constitutional essential: a legitimation-worthy constitution is one 
that guarantees the fair value not only of the political liberties but 
also of the cultural liberties.51
A. Semiotic Justice: The Fair Value of the Cultural Liberties
For Rawls, the equal political liberties appear on the list of 
the basic liberties because they, along with freedom of thought, allow 
ciWi]ens Wo deYeloS WKeir firsW Poral Sower ´Wo undersWand Wo aSSly 
and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles 
of political justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation.”52 
Citizens’ representatives in the original position would insist on 
guaranteeing the fair value of the equal political liberties because 
doing so is essenWial Wo SroWecWing WKe indisSensable firsW Poral 
power.53
They would be equally unwilling, however, to gamble with 
the second moral power.54 Liberty of conscience and freedom of 
50 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 44.
51 The locution “legitimation-worthy” is due to Frank Michelman. See Frank I. 
Michelman, 6ocioeconomic 5iJhts in &onstitXtional /aZ ([SlaininJ America AZay, 
6 ,ƜƢ
ƚ Jſ &ƝƜơƢſ Lſ 663, 674–75 (2008). This article will use “legitimate” 
and “legitimation-worthy” interchangeably.
52 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 19.
53 Id. at 106–10.
54 Many or all of the basic liberties play important roles in the realization of 
both moral powers. However, the emphasis of the political liberties is on their 
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association are, Rawls says, connected with “the capacity for a 
(complete) conception of the good,” and this explains their inclusion 
on the list of the equal basic liberties.55 This Part argues that, like the 
political liberties, the cultural liberties deserve special constitutional 
SroWecWion IroP e[ercises oI financial SoliWical or social clouW in 
order to ensure that citizens can develop the second moral power. 
Citizens need a voice in what their cultural world looks like. If wealth 
or social prestige determines what television shows and novels get 
Sroduced and SublisKed and Walked abouW aW bars and coffee sKoSs 
democracy is out of reach. Citizens’ representatives in the original 
position would be unwilling to risk losing a voice in what their 
shared cultural world looks like and would, therefore, insist on a 
proviso of semiotic justice parallel to the proviso of the fair value of 
the equal political liberties.
1. The Political Economy of Culture
The argument for a semiotic justice proviso is rooted in the 
notion that trustees in the original position know certain “general 
commonsense facts” about culture, just as they know “the general 
commonsense facts of human psychology and political sociology.”56 
These commonsense facts include an understanding of how political 
and economic realities predictably and systematically shape cultural 
production and consumption.
Culture is a public space in which members of a society 
articulate and develop their conceptions of the good and the meaning 
of life.57 I take “culture” to mean this space rather than any particular 
set of conceptions deployed within it. What constitutes culture, 
like the basic liberties, is given by a list of practices that express 
what people value non-instrumentally.58 Roughly speaking, culture 
is “all those practices, like the arts of description, communication, 
connecWion wiWK WKe firsW Poral Sower wKile WKe ePSKasis oI WKe liberWy oI 
conscience and freedom of association is their connection with the second 
moral power. See id. at 45.
55 Id. at 113.
56 Id. at 101.
57 See RƏƧƛƝƜƒ WƗƚƚƗƏƛơŽ &ƣƚƢƣƠƓ ƏƜƒ SƝƑƗƓƢƧŽ 1780–1950, at 34 
 drawing IroP WordsworWK Wo argue WKaW ´&ulWure WKe 
ePbodied 
sSiriW oI a 3eoSle
 WKe Wrue sWandard oI e[cellence becaPe aYailable in WKe 
progress of the [Nineteenth Century], as the court of appeal in which real 
Yalues were deWerPined usually in oSSosiWion Wo WKe 
IacWiWious
 Yalues WKrown 
up by the market and similar operations of society”).
58 See EƒƥƏƠƒ SƏƗƒŽ &ƣƚƢƣƠƓ ƏƜƒ ,ƛƞƓƠƗƏƚƗơƛ, at xii (1993).
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and representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, 
social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one 
of whose principal aims is pleasure.”59 People use these mechanisms 
to share and learn about their own and other’s conceptions of 
value, meaning, and the good. This list is vague because the precise 
contours of “culture” shift over time and from place to place. The 
list is expansive because limiting culture to certain varieties of 
human behavior risks treating culture as something that people do 
outside of and apart from their daily lives.60 While the list is vague 
and e[SansiYe iW is resWricWed Wo acWiYiWies WKaW reÁecW SeoSles· Yiews 
about what is non-instrumentally valuable or worthwhile. Culture 
does not include activities that are pursued only to accumulate 
wealth, political power, or social capital in order to pursue other 
59 Id.; see Balkin, supra note 4, at 36 (“By ‘culture’ I mean the collective 
processes of meaning-making in a society. The realm of culture, however, is 
much broader than the concern of the First Amendment or the free speech 
principle. Armaments and shampoo are part of culture; so too are murder 
and robbery. And all oI WKese WKings can affecW SeoSle·s liYes and sKaSe wKo 
they are.”). The practices that constitute culture have only relative autonomy 
from politics. In many ways, culture is intensely political. See, e.g., EƒƥƏƠƒ 
Wſ SƏƗƒŽ +ƣƛƏƜƗơƛ ƏƜƒ DƓƛƝƑƠƏƢƗƑ &ƠƗƢƗƑƗơƛ 128–29 (2004). But 
while politics and culture connect in many ways, culture has a domain that is 
at least partially its own and that is meaningfully distinct from the domain of 
politics. See 3ƗƓƠƠƓ %ƝƣƠƒƗƓƣŽ 7ƖƓ FƗƓƚƒ ƝƔ &ƣƚƢƣƠƏƚ 3ƠƝƒƣƑƢƗƝƜ 
² Randal JoKnson Wrans.  ´>7@Ke liWerary and arWisWic field . . . is 
conWained wiWKin WKe field oI Sower . . . wKile Sossessing a relaWiYe auWonoPy 
with respect to it, especially as regards its economic and political principles of 
hierarchization.”).
60 Selma James explains why culture cannot be narrowly delimited: 
The life-style unique to themselves which a people develop once they 
are enmeshed by capitalism, in response to and in rebellion against it, 
cannot be understood except as the totality of their capitalist lives. To 
delimit culture is to reduce it to a decoration of daily life. Culture is 
plays and poetry about the exploited; ceasing to wear mini-skirts and 
taking to trousers instead; the clash between the soul of Black Baptism 
and the guilt and sin of white Protestantism. Culture is also the shrill 
of the alarm clock that rings at 6 a.m. when a Black woman in London 
wakes her children to get them ready for the baby minder. Culture is 
how cold she feels at the bus stop and then how hot in the crowded 
bus. Culture is how you feel on Monday morning at eight when you 
clock in, wishing it was Friday, wishing your life away. Culture is the 
speed of the line or the weight and smell of dirty hospital sheets, and 
you meanwhile thinking what to make for tea that night. Culture is 
making the tea while your man watches the news on the telly.
 SƓƚƛƏ JƏƛƓơŽ SƓƦŽ RƏƑƓ ƏƜƒ &ƚƏơơ 13 (1975).
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distinct ends.61 
&ulWural sSace is noW wKolly defined by WKe SoliWical SracWices 
oI WKe sWaWe. ,W also reÁecWs inIorPal neWworks and SracWices oI 
cultural dissemination, which makes it somewhat more removed 
from the principles of political justice than the facility of political 
space.62 +oweYer culWural sSace is defined in iPSorWanW ways by WKe 
rules that the state institutes to regulate it and it is, in this way, part 
of the basic structure of society.63 The expressions of conceptions 
of the good that occupy the space of culture powerfully shape the 
resources that citizens who partake of the culture have available to 
them when forming, revising, and pursuing their own conceptions 
of the good.
The public facility of culture is a limited space, as is politics, 
where “[n]ot everyone can speak at once, or use the same public 
IaciliWy aW WKe saPe WiPe Ior differenW SurSoses.µ64 Public attention is 
a limited resource because humans have limited attention spans and 
can only take in so much information at a time. The limited nature 
of this space combined with its semi-autonomy from economics and 
SoliWics Pakes iW likely WKaW differences oI wealWK and sWaWus WKaW are 
SerPissible under Rawls·s difference SrinciSle will be aPSlified. 
Wealth cannot be directly converted into academic credentials, 
professional reputation, and membership in networks of artists or 
authors, but it can facilitate the acquisition of these resources. In 
turn, these resources can provide their holders with an outsized 
voice in articulating conceptions of the good in the space of culture.65 
The case of literature illustrates how representatives in 
the original position might understand culture to operate. In the 
domain of literature, “prestige is the quintessential form [that] 
power takes . . . the intangible authority unquestioningly accorded 
to the oldest, noblest, most legitimate (the terms being almost 
synonymous) literatures . . . .”66 Domination in “world literary 
space” exists in a variety of forms, including “linguistic, literary and 
61 Thus, “culture” in modern times could provide “the rickety shelter where 
the values and energies which industrial capitalism had no use for could take 
refuge . . . .” 7ƓƠƠƧ EƏƕƚƓƢƝƜŽ AƔƢƓƠ +ƝƣƠơ 7ƖƓƝƠƧ 25 (2003).
62 See Bourdieu, supra note 49, at 283.
63 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 10.
64 Id. at 111.
65 See 3ƗƓƠƠƓ %ƝƣƠƒƗƓƣŽ 7ƖƓ SƝƑƗƏƚ SƢƠƣƑƢƣƠƓơ ƝƔ ƢƖƓ EƑƝƜƝƛƧ 11 
(Chris Turner trans., 2005).
66 Pascale Casanova, Literature as a World, 31 1Ɠƥ LƓƔƢ RƓƤſ 71, 83 (2005).
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political domination.”67 These three forms of domination “overlap, 
interpenetrate and obscure one another to such an extent that often 
only the most obvious form—political-economic domination—
can be seen,”68 but because literature has its own non-economic 
Peasures oI worWK liWerary doPinaWion differs IroP SoliWical and 
economic domination. Nobel Prizes in literature, for instance, are 
not awarded exclusively to authors from wealthy countries but are 
awarded exclusively to authors whose writing engages in a particular 
manner with a chain of canonized literature going back to writings 
produced several hundred years ago in the Rhine Valley.69 Because 
literary power can be accumulated semi-independently of economic 
and SoliWical Sower ineTualiWies SerPiWWed by Rawls·s difference 
principle can grow into intractable domination in literary space, 
allowing those individuals—like authors and editors—and entities—
like the Nobel Prize committee—who control access to literary 
prestige to act as gatekeepers, determining who can and cannot 
contribute their expression to world literary space.70
I take the foregoing description of the economics of literary 
SroducWion Wo be suűcienWly absWracW Wo counW as general knowledge 
about political sociology available to the parties in the original 
position. Likewise, it seems apparent that something like this 
account can be extended to visual art as well.71 Extending this theory 
of how bourgeois “high” art and literature operate to “low” cultural 
production is trickier. Does the production of, for instance, television 
programming allow individuals and institutions to accumulate power 
over time, gradually leading to the accentuation and exaggeration of 
inequalities? An optimistic view is taken by John Fiske, who argues 
that television is “a text of contestation which contains forces of 
67 Id. at 72, 86.
68 Id. at 86.
69 See id. at 74–75, 83.
70 Such control is not just arbitrary; power can be accumulated in world literary 
space over time precisely because access to the literary center is determined 
by how literary texts relate to the existing world literary canon. If an author 
writes a novel that engages in the “right way” with the tradition that makes 
up the global literary center, the gatekeepers are supposed to grant the 
novelist admission, and they often actually do so. This is demonstrated by the 
entry of “post-colonial” authors from Jean Rhys to Salman Rushdie into the 
world literary canon. This non-arbitrary control is still a form of domination 
insofar as the standards for literary prestige are set by an elite cartel, rather 
than democratically. See 3ƏơƑƏƚƓ &ƏơƏƜƝƤƏŽ 7ƖƓ WƝƠƚƒ RƓƞƣƐƚƗƑ ƝƔ 
LƓƢƢƓƠơ 117–18 (M.B. DeBevoise trans., 2004).
71 See %ƝƣƠƒƗƓƣ, supra note 61, at 40–41.
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closure and of openness and . . . allows viewers to make meanings 
that are subculturally pertinent to them . . . .”72
Other cultural theorists, however, are not as sanguine about 
the “openness” of late capitalist cultural production. Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno argue that the “culture industry” dominates 
WKe field oI SoSular SroducWion and WKaW accuPulaWions oI caSiWal 
are necessary to develop mass culture.73 Only “those who are already 
part of the system or are co-opted into it by the decisions of banks 
and industrial capital, can enter the pseudomarket [of culture] as 
sellers.”74 Liberties to write, to make music, or to make movies are 
not worth the same amount to everyone. Some people are far better 
positioned to make use of these liberties than are others.
One may wonder whether technological developments in 
the past-half century, and especially the internet, have fragmented 
“the culture industry.” The development of networked information 
economies has increased the number of people who participate in 
culWural SroducWion and wKo can define wKaW culWure WKey consuPe 
and how they consume it.75 Nevertheless, contemporary cultural 
theorists suggest that in spite of technological changes in cultural 
production, it is still dominated by heavily capitalized institutional 
actors that aim to satisfy highly conventional consumer preferences.76 
When the technological platforms on which cultural consumers and 
producers rely encourage users to create in a manner that is primarily 
lucrative for media corporations, the potentially “critical” cultural 
72 FƗơƙƓ, supra note 13, at 239.
73 MƏƦ +ƝƠƙƖƓƗƛƓƠ ż 7ƖƓƝƒƝƠ Wſ AƒƝƠƜƝŽ DƗƏƚƓƑƢƗƑ ƝƔ 
EƜƕƚƗƕƖƢƓƜƛƓƜƢƌ 3ƖƗƚƝơƝƞƖƗƑƏƚ FƠƏƕƛƓƜƢơ 131 (Gunzelin Schmid 
Noerr ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., 2002).
74 Id.
75 <ƝƑƖƏƗ %ƓƜƙƚƓƠŽ 7ƖƓ WƓƏƚƢƖ ƝƔ 1ƓƢƥƝƠƙơƌ +Ɲƥ SƝƑƗƏƚ 
3ƠƝƒƣƑƢƗƝƜ 7ƠƏƜơƔƝƠƛơ MƏƠƙƓƢơ ƏƜƒ FƠƓƓƒƝƛ 138–39 (2006).
76 See =ƓƧƜƓƞ 7ƣƔƓƙƑƗŽ 7ƥƗƢƢƓƠ ƏƜƒ 7ƓƏƠ GƏơƌ 7ƖƓ 3ƝƥƓƠ ƏƜƒ 
FƠƏƕƗƚƗƢƧ ƝƔ 1ƓƢƥƝƠƙƓƒ 3ƠƝƢƓơƢ 137 (2017); see also Jessa Crispin, 
%ooNslXt :as %orn in an (ra of ,nternet )reedom 7oday·s :eb +as .illed ,t, 
GƣƏƠƒƗƏƜ (May 16, 2016, 8:50 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/books/
booksblog/2016/may/16/bookslut-was-born-in-an-era-of-internet-freedom-
todays-web-has-killed-it (explaining that the literary website, Bookslut, 
closed because “[i]n order to make enough money to run a real publication 
[online], you have to write about books everyone has already heard of. You 
have to indulge in clickbait. You have to narrow your conversation down to 
the one that is already happening elsewhere. This reinforces the white male-
dominated paradigm, where one type of voice is elevated above all others.”).
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speech of users is reabsorbed into preexisting media models.77
Furthermore, historical and empirical scholarship suggests 
WKaW WKe disruSWiYe effecWs oI innoYaWions like WKe deYeloSPenW oI 
the internet on cultural production may be short-lived. Tim Wu 
argues WKaW innoYaWions including radio and filP iniWially disruSWed 
culture industry incumbents but grew over time to be dominated by 
monopolists or cartels that centralized economic and cultural power.78 
Bradi Heaberlin and Simon DeDeo argue that when Wikipedia 
began it was characterized by a decentralized, democratic system 
of editing, but over time a “leadership class with privileged access 
to information and social networks” emerged that relies on norms 
created early in Wikipedia’s existence and gradually institutionalized 
over time to sustain its power.79 7Kese findings suggesW WKaW WKere is 
a good reason to worry that even strongly consumer-driven internet 
culture is susceptible to risks of centralization of gate-keeping power 
in the hands of a small number of corporations or individuals.
This description of culture as a limited space relies on a 
premise that culture is, in some respects, a competitive space. 
Scholars of culture do not universally accept this premise.80 However, 
there is at minimum a meaningful risk of the centralization and de-
democratization of cultural power even in societies with democratic 
political institutions and technologies, like the internet, that lower 
barriers to entry into the ranks of cultural producers. However the 
basic structure of society is constituted, cultural space will tend to 
77 See generally Eduardo Navas, &XltXre and 5emi[ A 7heory of &XltXral 6Xblation, in 
7ƖƓ RƝƣƢƚƓƒƕƓ &ƝƛƞƏƜƗƝƜ ƢƝ RƓƛƗƦ SƢƣƒƗƓơ 102 (Eduardo Navas, 
Owen Gallagher & xtine burrough eds., 2015).
78 7Ɨƛ WƣŽ 7ƖƓ MƏơƢƓƠ SƥƗƢƑƖƌ 7ƖƓ RƗơƓ ƏƜƒ FƏƚƚ ƝƔ ,ƜƔƝƠƛƏƢƗƝƜ 
EƛƞƗƠƓơ 159–67 (2011).
79 Jennifer Ouellette, Wikipedia Is Basically a Corporate Bureaucracy, According to a New 
Study, GƗƨƛƝƒƝ (Apr. 25, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://gizmodo.com/wikipedia-
is-basically-a-corporate-bureaucracy-accordi-1746955234 (quoting Simon 
DeDeo); Bradi Heaberlin & Simon DeDeo, 7he (YolXtion of :iNiSedia·s Norm 
Network, FƣƢƣƠƓ ,ƜƢƓƠƜƓƢ (Apr. 20, 2016) https://www.mdpi.com/1999-
5903/8/2/14/htm; see also Jinhyuk Yun, Sang Hoon Lee & Hawoong Jeong, 
Intellectual Interchanges in the History of the Massive Online Open-Editing 
Encyclopedia, Wikipedia, 93 3ƖƧơƗƑƏƚ RƓƤſ E 012307-1, 012307-9 (2016) 
(articles on English language Wikipedia that people are highly attracted to 
edit grow longer, which reduces the number of editors willing to participate 
and brings about inequality among the editors, which becomes more severe 
with time).
80 See, e.g., Jonathan Riley, DefendinJ &XltXral PlXralism :ithin /iberal /imits, 
30 3Ɲƚſ 7ƖƓƝƠƧ 68, 78–91 (2002) (defending a liberal pluralist theory of 
culture).
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be limited because it, like politics, is a shared public facility. There is, 
therefore, a risk that cultural power will tend to accumulate in a few 
hands when moderate economic inequality is tolerated.81
The picture of culture as a limited and competitive space is 
crucial to establishing that semiotic justice is required by Rawls’s 
firsW SrinciSle. Anyone wKo denies WKaW culWural Sower is disWincW 
from underlying economic and political power is likely to think 
WKaW any SrinciSle oI SoliWical MusWice Iocused sSecifically on culWural 
liberWies is suSerÁuous. ,I culWural sSace does noW sysWePaWically Wend 
to allow accumulation of cultural power, then Rawls’s two principles 
may produce the best outcomes for cultural liberties that can be 
achieved in a democratic society without incorporating additional 
SroWecWions sSecifically Ior WKe culWural liberWies. 7Kose wKo reMecW 
the view of culture presented here might, however, agree that it 
is important to protect the fair value of the cultural liberties as a 
constitutional essential, for the reasons presented in the following 
section, but locate the rationale for doing so in the need to protect 
the fair value of the political liberties.
2. Culture and the Good
Having established the “general commonsense facts” about 
culture that trustees in the original position possess, the second step 
in the argument for the proviso of semiotic justice is to establish 
that the shape of a culture is tightly connected to the ability of 
participants to form, revise, and pursue their own conceptions of 
the good. While the range of possible conceptions of the good is not 
strictly limited to the exact set of such conceptions in a culture in 
which one is born, the vast majority of conceptions of the good that 
persons exercising the second moral power will form over the course 
of a complete life will fall more or less in the range of conceptions of 
the good in the society or societies in which they live most of their 
lives.82 Cognitive psychologists might describe this as the result 
81 Cf. Daniels, supra note 32, at 257 (“If one thought that the mechanisms 
through which unequal wealth operates to destroy equal liberty were simple 
and insolatable, then perhaps constitutional provisions could be devised to 
solve the problem. Rawls . . . suggests constitutional provisions for the public 
funding of political parties and for the subsidy of public debate. . . . But there 
is little reason to believe that the mechanisms are so simple and that such 
safeguards would work.”).
82 See Talcott Parsons, The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory, 45 ,ƜƢ
ƚ Jſ 
EƢƖƗƑơ 282, 295–96 (1935); Ronald Fischer & Ype H. Poortinga, Are Cultural 
Values the Same as the Values of Individuals? An Examination of Similarities in Personal, 
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of an availability heuristic.83 This availability may also harden, in 
certain circumstances, into something like “ideology,” systematically 
foreclosing particular conceptions of the good.84 Furthermore, 
culWure is one oI WKe YiWal fields in wKicK conceSWions oI WKe good are 
presented, worked out, revised, and evaluated in public.
One of the central insights of democratic theories of 
culture developed by intellectual property scholars is the claim 
that decisions about how to organize public cultural spaces deeply 
impact individuals’ ability to autonomously shape their own 
understandings of what a good life looks like.85 As Jack M. Balkin 
argues,“[p]articipation in culture is important because we are made 
of culture; the right to participate in culture is valuable because it lets 
us have a say in the forces that shape the world we live in and make 
us who we are.”86 Try as one might to make oneself independent 
from others, one’s ideas of what a good life looks like depend deeply 
on others.87 An individual can build on others’ ideas, but, at least 
for the vast majority of people, it is possible to diverge only so far 
from other people’s conception of the good. Certain forms of life 
appear as “necessary” or “impossible” because of settlement of both 
politics and culture.88
For instance, imagine a society in which almost all cultural 
expression expressed the beliefs that “the relation of male to female 
is that of natural superior to natural inferior”89 and that “a man’s 
and a woPan·s courage and WePSerance differ.µ90 If the cultural 
understanding of gender were thick enough, there would be no 
Social and Cultural Value Structures, 12 ,ƜƢ
ƚ Jſ &ƠƝơơ &ƣƚƢƣƠƏƚ MƕƛƢſ 157, 
165–66 (2012).
83 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, AYailability A +eXristic for -XdJinJ 
Frequency and Probability, 5 &ƝƕƜƗƢƗƤƓ 3ơƧƑƖƝƚſ 207, 208–09 (1973).
84 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, )eminism, 0ar[ism, 0ethod, and the 6tate An 
Agenda for Theory, 7 SƗƕƜơ 515, 542–43 (1982) (describing how “male power” 
acts as an ideological “myth that makes itself true”).
85 See Bracha & Syed, supra note 4, at 254–56.
86 Balkin, supra note 4, at 6.
87 See Frank I. Michelman, 7he Priority of /iberty 5aZls and ´7iers of 6crXtinyµ, in 
RƏƥƚơ
ơ 3ƝƚƗƢƗƑƏƚ LƗƐƓƠƏƚƗơƛ, 175, 188–89 (Thom Brooks & Martha 
Nussbaum eds., 2015) (noting the importance of “open access to the 
conversation of humankind distant and close” to the “formation, revision, 
and pursuit of an individual conception of the good. . . .”).
88 See RƝƐƓƠƢƝ MƏƜƕƏƐƓƗƠƏ 8ƜƕƓƠŽ 7ƖƓ SƓƚƔ AƥƏƙƓƜƓƒƌ 3ƠƏƕƛƏƢƗơƛ 
8ƜƐƝƣƜƒ 49 (2007).
89 AƠƗơƢƝƢƚƓŽ 3ƝƚƗƢƗƑơ 1254b13–15 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., 1998).
90 Id. at 1277b20.
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reason Wo see gendered differences in disWribuWion as reTuiring any 
sort of special scrutiny. If the least advantaged members of a society 
turned out to be women, this would provide no reason for suspicion 
about the justice of the basic structure: from the standpoint of the 
hypothetical society, women are naturally ruled by men, so it should 
noW coPe as any surSrise iI PosW goYernPenW oűces are Keld by 
Pen. FurWKerPore SeoSle PigKW see WKis difference as adYanWageous 
Ior woPen WKeir WePSeraPenWs are IundaPenWally differenW IroP 
WKose oI Pen and WKey do noW benefiW IroP oűces WKaW reTuire WKeP 
to lead public lives.91
In such a society, claims about gender would not present 
themselves as political claims. The political discourse of the 
hypothetical society could be completely devoid of any discussion 
of gender, and such claims would present themselves as “general 
commonsense facts of human psychology.”92 Perhaps Rawls’s 
political conception of the person in its articulation through the 
two principles of justice could solve much of this problem. The 
use oI SriPary goods Wo Peasure welIare in WKe difference SrinciSle 
should guarantee women access to as many primary goods as men. 
Additionally, fair equality of opportunity will ensure that a system 
of “careers open to talents” prevails as part of the constitutional 
essentials and will ensure that women who wish to pursue the talents 
necessary for a career have access to the resources, like education, 
necessary to do so.93 7Ke firsW SrinciSle will also guaranWee WKaW all oI 
the basic liberties are, at the least, formally open to women as well 
as men.94 But ensuring that these liberties have their fair value to 
women seems much harder: women might not participate in public 
cultural expression, but, the hypothetical society might say, there 
is no reason WKaW WKis is unIair iW siPSly reÁecWs WKe lesser WalenW 
of women, who have the rights to write novels and act in plays but 
choose not to do so because of their feminine temperament or their 
lack of talent. If it so happens that, over time, it becomes harder 
and harder for women to participate in shaping the culture because 
networks that control access to cultural production are controlled 
91 See &ƝƠƒƓƚƗƏ FƗƜƓŽ DƓƚƣơƗƝƜơ ƝƔ GƓƜƒƓƠƌ +Ɲƥ 2ƣƠ MƗƜƒơŽ SƝƑƗƓƢƧŽ 
ƏƜƒ 1ƓƣƠƝơƓƦƗơƛ &ƠƓƏƢƓ DƗƔƔƓƠƓƜƑƓ 67–77 (2010) (describing and 
debunking such theories).
92 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 101.
93 See id. at 47 (“[S]ome principle of opportunity is a constitutional essential—
for example, a principle requiring an open society, one with careers open to 
talents . . . .”).
94 See id. at 167.
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by men who share the background cultural beliefs about gender, this 
may be no cause for concern, because the people getting shut out 
from cultural production are the people with less talent.
Perhaps such an accumulation of power would violate 
fair equality of opportunity. But in a society that operated with a 
definiWion oI ´naWiYe endowPenWsµ WKaW saw gender as SarW oI one·s 
endowment of talent to accomplish particular aims, the hypothetical 
society’s interpretation of fair equality of opportunity might be 
permissible.95
7Ke difference SrinciSle PigKW reTuire WKaW woPen KaYe oWKer 
opportunities open to them, but this is possible in the hypothetical 
society. Women might, for instance, have opportunities to excel in 
domesticity that men do not have. At the legislative stage, when the 
legislators make complex inferences about social and economic facts, 
iW is diűculW Wo see Kow MusWice as Iairness could e[clude WKe culWural 
background that shapes beliefs about the reality of gender. The thick 
cultural belief about gender that I described applies equally to all 
domains of the hypothetical society. Women could participate in 
government in this society—and could even think of themselves as 
political equals of men—but could remain committed to the social 
inequality of men and women.
Now, perhaps this hypothetical society is not so bad; at the 
very least, with all of its constitutional safeguards in place, it looks 
like the sort of decent hierarchical society that Rawls thinks liberal 
societies should tolerate.96 However, it is hard to believe that such a 
society is made up of free and equal citizens.97 This problem could 
be overcome with a constitutional guarantee of the fair value of the 
cultural liberties, clearly spelling out that the liberties of participating 
in culture must have roughly the same worth for all citizens. To avoid 
illegitimacy, all citizens must have a meaningful chance to challenge 
the culture that makes some social arrangements seem possible and 
others impossible. Any social arrangements that allow some citizens’ 
cultural contributions to be disregarded because they are disliked 
by a clique of non-democratic elites, or because other citizens will 
95 For Rawls, fair equality of opportunity requires that, “supposing that there is 
a distribution of native endowments, those who have the same level of talent 
and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts should have the same 
prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin . . . .” Id. at 44.
96 See JƝƖƜ RƏƥƚơ, 7ƖƓ LƏƥ ƝƔ ƢƖƓ 3ƓƝƞƚƓơ 62–70 (1999).
97 See Susan Moller Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 EƢƖƗƑơ 
23, 29 (1994); see also Justin Schwartz, 5iJhts of ,neTXality 5aZlsian -Xstice, (TXal 
Opportunity, and the Status of the Family, 7 LƓƕƏƚ 7ƖƓƝƠƧ 83, 87 (2001).
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not listen to the contributors’ ideas due to the contributors’ race, 
gender, class, or social position, fail to provide the fair equal access 
to culture needed for liberal legitimacy.98
If this picture of cultural power is correct, the ability of certain 
actors to accumulate cultural capital and exercise disproportionate 
Sower oYer WKe field oI culWure WKaW SreYenWs oWKer ciWi]ens IroP 
participating in the give and take of cultural life, in turn, prevents 
citizens from forming their own conceptions of the good. Because of 
the extent to which conceptions of the good are endogenous to the 
articulations of these conceptions in cultural space, in order to fully 
develop and realize the second moral power, citizens must be able to 
participate in shaping culture, expressing their conceptions of good 
in the shared facility of culture.
3. A New Proviso and Its Meaning
It is possible that access to cultural space will be distorted 
by otherwise-permissible inequalities in wealth, power, and prestige 
in much the same way that political space would be so distorted 
without Rawls’s proviso of the fair value of the equal political 
liberties. Such a distortion will similarly undermine the capacities of 
the parties to social cooperation to develop the two moral powers, 
particularly the second, over the course of their lives. To address the 
possibility of such distortions, it is necessary for Rawlsian political 
theorists to modify the two principles of justice with an additional 
proviso of semiotic justice. The proviso of semiotic justice provides 
the following:
(1) The worth of all cultural liberties to all citizens, 
whatever their economic or social position, must 
be suűcienWly eTual in WKe sense WKaW all KaYe a Iair 
opportunity to contribute to public cultural expression 
and Wo affecW WKe conWenW oI arWisWic liWerary Pedia 
98 Rawlsian liberals might worry that such a requirement slides toward 
compelled listening. A constitutional guarantee of the fair value of the cultural 
liberties does not suggest that citizens must be legally compelled to listen to 
one another’s cultural contributions, as the constitutional essentials might be 
saWisfied by a wide range oI legal regiPes. 7Ke suggesWion Pade Kere is WKaW 
citizens must not reject other citizens’ cultural contributions because of their 
gender MusW as ciWi]ens PusW noW reIuse Wo YoWe Ior candidaWes Ior Sublic oűce 
because of their gender. Cf. RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 166 (“If the so-called 
private sphere is a space alleged to be exempt from justice, then there is no 
such thing.”).
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and other cultural production. 
As with the proviso of the fair value of the equal political liberties, 
this idea “parallels that of fair equality of opportunity in the second 
principle.”99
(2) Furthermore, when the parties adopt the two 
principles of justice in the original position, they 
undersWand WKe firsW SrinciSle Wo include WKe SroYiso 
of semiotic justice.
When integrated into Rawls’s account of justice, semiotic justice 
will lead Wo WKe inclusion in WKe firsW SrinciSle oI MusWice oI ´a SroYi-
so that the equal political liberties [and the cultural liberties,] and 
only these liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.”100
Rawls’s proviso of the fair value of political liberties insulates 
a dePocracy·s SoliWical liIe IroP nonSoliWical inÁuences. ,W guards 
againsW SoliWical acWion WKaW reÁecWs ineTualiWies oI wealWK or sWaWus 
rather than citizens’ considered judgments about how best to 
achieve justice.101 Similarly, semiotic justice protects a democracy’s 
cultural life from unfair control by economically or politically 
powerful people. It insulates the judgments that citizens make about 
what is valuable or worthwhile in life from being shaped or unfairly 
inÁuenced by ineTualiWies oI wealWK or sWaWus WKaW KaYe noWKing Wo 
do with citizen’s autonomous, non-instrumental judgments about 
the good. This is not to deny that cultural liberties and political 
liberties overlap. Similar basic liberties, including rights of freedom 
of conscience and expression, enable citizens to participate in both 
the political life and the cultural life of their communities.102 The 
novel feature of semiotic justice is that it protects the fair value of 
liberWies WKaW are noW needed Wo reali]e WKe firsW Poral Sower buW are 
nevertheless needed to realize the second.103
99 Id. at 149.
100 Id.
101 See id. at 51.
102 See Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 1ƥſ Lſ RƓƤſ 
1053, 1054 (2016) (“Freedom of speech does more than protect democracy; 
it also promotes a democratic culture.”); see also RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 
169 (describing the role that free speech plays in the political life of liberal 
democracies).
103 Rawls might note that our shared culture shapes our understanding of what 
social arrangements are politically possible. Therefore, respecting the fair 
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There are two manners in which semiotic justice can be 
violated. First, semiotic justice is violated when attempts at cultural 
participation (e.g., submissions of manuscripts for publication, 
aWWePSWs Wo secure SroducWion Poney Ior screenSlays or efforWs 
to sell records to consumers) are assessed other than on the basis 
of what individual citizens, in their role as primary evaluators of 
culture, believe to be culturally good or worthwhile.104 When some 
citizens cannot participate in cultural production because they 
hold a view of the good that diverges from the view of the good 
held by non-democratic gatekeepers—such as when elite networks 
of tastemakers whose views of the good do not represent those of 
typical citizens control access to cultural markets—access to the 
second moral power is compromised.105
Second, even in the absence of non-democratic gatekeepers, 
semiotic justice is violated when the access of some citizens to a 
cultural voice is foreclosed because other citizens refuse to entertain 
their proposed contributions to the culture on the basis of features 
WKaW do noW reÁecW WKeir culWural WalenW and PoWiYaWion sucK as 
their race, gender, class, or social position.106 When citizens cannot 
have their voices heard about what a good culture looks like, not 
because others disagree with them about the nature of the good but 
because of who they are, the second moral power is compromised.107 
value of the political liberties already requires guaranteeing the fair value of 
cultural liberties. On this interpretation, the fair value of the political liberties 
would entail exactly the same reform agenda as semiotic justice. While I would 
be happy with this outcome, I argue directly from the two moral powers to a 
guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties because I regard culture as 
semi-autonomous from politics and so regard this strategy as overly reductive 
in its description of culture. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
104 This claim raises questions about how minority tastes get developed and 
published. See infra note 140 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
role of subcultural tastes in semiotic justice.
105 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 18–19.
106 Social position is defined Kere Wo encoPSass socially salienW ideological 
commitments about the good that are associated with membership in or 
control of institutions that manage or restrict access to a society’s cultural 
space, like religion, as well as personal characteristics, like personal grooming, 
tone of voice, and physical appearance. Cf. Harris v. Capital Growth Inv’rs XIV, 
 3.d     &al.  defining ´Sersonal cKaracWerisWicsµ.
107 This relies on a background claim that racist judgments are not judgments 
about what is non-instrumentally worthwhile but are instead instrumental 
actions, aimed at reinforcing social hierarchies and subordination. A 
Nietzschean white supremacist might insist that his racist dismissal of 
cultural contributions actually is a non-instrumental judgment about the 
428 Gingerich
Because the fair value of the cultural liberties can be compromised 
even in the absence of non-democratic gatekeepers, respecting the 
requirements of semiotic justice requires that citizens make their 
own autonomous judgments about the value of contributions to 
culture. Citizens must not outsource such judgments by relying 
on irrelevant social markers that bear no relationship to their own 
judgments about what is non-instrumentally good, like race or 
gender. 
This is not to suggest that semiotic justice is violated simply 
by WKe IacW WKaW soPe SeoSle are SoSular or inÁuenWial creaWors or 
critics of cultural goods. Just as Rawls’s fair value proviso is not 
violated simply because one person happens to have a better chance 
than another of being elected president because they are a more 
charismatic political speaker, semiotic justice is not necessarily 
violated if one person publishes a novel while another does not.108 
Even if only a small number of people get their novels published or 
their movies produced, semiotic justice is not violated as long as the 
secondary ParkeWs WKrougK wKicK WKose noYels and filPs geW Pade 
operate fairly.109 If citizens all had roughly the same opportunity to 
inÁuence wKicK noYels are SublisKed WKen iW would noW be a SrobleP 
from the standpoint of semiotic justice if one person could not get 
anyone to publish their novel. On the other hand, semiotic justice 
might be violated if only novelists who had already published, or only 
novelists who wrote in the style endorsed by a small, non-democratic 
cartel of publishers, could publish. If citizens all had roughly equal 
economic resources, they could vote with their pocketbooks for 
the sort of novels that they think are worthwhile. When secondary 
ParkeWs eűcienWly aggregaWe WKe auWonoPous culWural MudgPenWs oI 
economically equal citizens, they can provide a mechanism for the 
democratic control of culture. If, on the other hand, such markets 
are controlled by cultural elites who do not respond to economic 
incentives, or if citizens possess greatly unequal economic resources, 
then secondary markets cannot, by themselves, provide for semiotic 
justice.110
good, because a white culture is non-instrumentally valuable, but such a racist 
is already far beyond the bounds of liberal reciprocity. See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 
96, at 126.
108 , owe WKis SoinW Wo Seana SKiffrin Sersonal conYersaWion.
109 I owe this point to Robert D. Goldstein (personal conversation).
110 It might be worried that semiotic justice will lead to a decimation of “high 
culture,” leading to an end to publicly supported art that is valuable but 
unpopular, since high concept poetry and avant-garde theater might be 
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The fact that semiotic justice may be violated if publishers 
only accept novels from novelists who inhabit elite social circles 
or who write in the style that the cartel of publishers endorses as 
acceptable does not suggest that blind review by publishers should 
be legally mandated. The laws required to ensure semiotic justice 
need not include the direct legal regulation of how publishers make 
decisions about what to print. There are a range of institutional 
configuraWions WKaW can SroYide WKe condiWions Ior WKe Iair Yalue oI 
cultural liberties. The legal apparatus used to guarantee semiotic 
justice could function by limiting accumulations of wealth that 
tend to produce inequalities of status and power over time, by 
ensuring more competition among publishers, or by sponsoring 
publicly funded presses that are controlled by democratically elected 
oűcials.111 At the same time, direct legal regulation of publishers’ 
decisions cannoW be ÁaWly e[cluded on WKe grounds oI Iree sSeecK 
because the fair value of cultural liberties is as primary as are the 
oWKer eTual basic liberWies. WKen WKese liberWies conÁicW in SarWicular 
cases ´ WKeir claiPs PusW be adMusWed Wo fiW inWo one coKerenW scKePe 
of liberties.”112
Semiotic justice is neither exclusively about rights to 
participate in cultural production nor exclusively about rights 
to participate in cultural consumption. Semiotic justice aims to 
guarantee everyone a fair chance to have a say about the culture 
that they live in. Productive cultural activities, like writing poetry or 
making paintings, can obviously contribute to the shared culture that 
people inhabit. Consumptive choices also shape the culture, both 
by serving as a form of self-expression113 and by incentivizing the 
production of certain cultural goods by creating a market for them. A 
reader who purchases a novel helps to create a market for the novel 
thought to have little “democratic appeal.” This concern is misplaced because 
SeoSle can KaYe differenW KigKer and lower order culWural SreIerences and can 
reÁecWiYely endorse WKe difference beWween WKe Wwo. A reader can wanW coPSle[ 
ficWion wiWK WePSorally disconWinuous narraWiYes Wo be Iunded and Sroduced 
eYen iI Pore oIWen WKan noW WKey would raWKer read ´WrasKyµ science ficWion.
111 See Jen Kreder, Should Government Publish Books?, 3ƠƏƥƔơ%ƚƝƕ (Feb. 26, 2018, 
9:45 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/02/should-
government-publish-books.html (arguing in favor of public sponsorship of 
university presses on the grounds that “[t]he impact of writing . . . is in the 
dissemination of the ideas expressed to an audience—now or in the future” 
and ´>i@W is WKe rare selISublisKed book WKaW finds a significanW audience.µ.
112 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 104.
113 See Rebecca Tushnet, &oSy 7his (ssay +oZ )air Use Doctrine +arms )ree 6Seech and 
How Copying Serves It, 114 <ƏƚƓ LſJſ 535, 567–68 (2004).
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and others of its kind, and if they form their own interpretations of 
the novel as they read it, they may then discuss their interpretation 
with their friends and thereby help to shape the cultural reception 
of the novel. Semiotic justice requires a rough equality of access 
to all culture-shaping activities, both the productive and the 
consumptive, because these activities are the mechanisms through 
which individuals exchange views and coordinate with one another 
about conceptions of the good.114
Finally, semiotic justice is a statement of a constitutional 
essenWial WKaW is inWegraWed inWo WKe firsW SrinciSle oI MusWice raWKer 
WKan a clarificaWion oI WKe Peaning oI WKe SrinciSle oI Iair eTualiWy 
oI oSSorWuniWy and WKe difference SrinciSle wKicK aSSly Wo laws 
regulating culture in the legislative and judicial stages. The urgency 
of the cultural liberties is so great that they number among the 
constitutional essentials for a just society: if the fair value of 
liberWies Wo conWribuWe Wo Sublic culWural e[Sression and Wo affecW WKe 
content of artistic, literary, media, and other cultural production 
is not guaranteed, citizens risk losing the opportunity to develop 
their second moral power, a risk that they must be unwilling 
to take, given Rawls’s political conception of the person.115 The 
constitutional essentials—those items necessary for a constitution 
Wo be legiWiPaWe³include WKe firsW SrinciSle oI MusWice along wiWK 
some narrow principle “requiring an open society, one with careers 
open to talents” and a “social minimum providing for the basic needs 
of all citizens.”116 The principle of an open society and the social 
minimum are much narrower than the principle of fair equality of 
oSSorWuniWy and WKe difference SrinciSle resSecWiYely buW WKe firsW 
principle in its entirety forms a constitutional essential. That the 
proviso of semiotic justice is a constitutional essential is not the 
same as saying that it should be judicially enforceable, however.117 A 
114 +oweYer because SroducWiYe acWiYiWies Wend Wo sKaSe culWure Pore significanWly 
than do consumptive activities, semiotic justice will tend to require that all 
citizens have roughly equal ability to participate in culture as producers, not 
just as consumers.
115 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 105.
116 Id. at 47–48.
117 See Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights and Liberal Political 
-XstiÀcation, in EƦƞƚƝƠƗƜƕ SƝƑƗƏƚ RƗƕƖƢơƌ %ƓƢƥƓƓƜ 7ƖƓƝƠƧ ƏƜƒ 
3ƠƏƑƢƗƑƓ 21, 26 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007) (noting 
that some constitutional norms are meant to be fully binding and obligatory 
Ior oűcials Wo wKoP WKey aSSly eYen WKougK ´we do noW e[SecW or wisK our 
judiciary to get too much mixed up with enforcing compliance” with them).
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constitution could include the proviso of semiotic justice, but this 
proviso might be accompanied by a “judges, keep out” sign leaving 
enforcement of the proviso up to the legislature, the executive, and 
the citizens themselves.118
In many respects, the requirements of semiotic justice are 
similar to those of fair equality of opportunity. Fair equality of 
opportunity, like semiotic justice, requires that positions of cultural 
prestige be open to all who are equally talented and motivated 
to contribute to culture.119 However, for Rawls, fair equality of 
opportunity is not part of the constitutional essentials of a liberal 
dePocracy so iW PusW giYe way wKen and iI iW coPes inWo conÁicW 
wiWK guaranWeeing WKe eTual basic liberWies oI WKe firsW SrinciSle.120 
Seana SKiffrin Kas argued WKaW Iair eTualiWy oI oSSorWuniWy should 
be included among the constitutional essentials, even if Rawls 
failed to explicitly locate it there.121 ,n SKiffrin·s Yiew ´insulaW>ing@ 
access Wo ePSloyPenW and SosiWions oI Sower IroP WKe inÁuence oI 
morally arbitrary factors, such as race, gender, and class position” 
makes “perfect sense” given the moral interests of parties to 
democratic social cooperation.122 The argument for semiotic justice 
is coPSaWible wiWK yeW disWincW IroP SKiffrin·s arguPenW. WKile 
SKiffrin·s arguPenW Iocuses on WKe connecWion beWween work and the 
formation and pursuit of conceptions of the good,123 semiotic justice 
focuses on the role that participating in culture, whether or not as 
part of one’s occupation, plays in realizing the moral powers.
118 See Lawrence Sager, Material Rights, Underenforcement, and the Adjudication Thesis, 
90 %ſ8ſ Lſ RƓƤſ 579, 580 (2010) (“[A] conscientious constitutional court 
will on some occasions stop short of fully enforcing the Constitution because 
of particular features of the judicial process, but . . . these institutional 
limitations on the judiciary do not mark the substantive boundaries of the 
Constitution.”); Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 
SƢƏƜſ Lſ RƓƤſ 203, 244 (2008); see also Rehan Abeyratne, Socioeconomic Rights 
in the ,ndian &onstitXtion 7oZard a %roader &onceStion of /eJitimacy, 39 %ƠƝƝƙſ Jſ 
,ƜƢ
ƚ Lſ 1, 7 (2014) (discussing the Directive Principles of State Policy in the 
Indian constitution in the framework of Rawlsian constitutional theory). But 
see SKiffrin supra note 14, at 1675 (arguing that the vagueness of fair value 
rights is often no worse for judicial enforcement than is the vagueness of 
formal equal basic liberties).
119 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 24, at 73 (“In all sectors of society there should be 
roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly 
motivated and endowed.”).
120 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 47.
121 SKiffrin supra note 14, at 1672–73.
122 Id. at 1653.
123 Id. at 1666
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B. Objections
Rawls PigKW offer WKree obMecWions Wo WKe arguPenW WKaW a 
guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties must be added to 
Kis firsW SrinciSle oI MusWice. 7Kis secWion considers and resSonds Wo 
each of these objections.
1. Why Extend the Fair Value of Equal Basic Liberties 
Beyond Discrete Competitions?
In arguing that Rawls’s rationale for guaranteeing the fair 
value of the political liberties also applies to the fair value of the 
cultural liberties, this article has assumed that Rawls’s proviso of 
the fair value of political liberties should be broadly interpreted to 
protect the exercise of these liberties in a wide range of settings 
where citizens pursue their conceptions of justice, including 
elections, formal and informal debates about policy proposals, and 
also public discussions about the proper aims of government.124
An alternative reading of Rawls’s proviso regards it as 
more narrowly focused on political contests, like elections, which 
are discrete events with clear winners and losers.125 Under this 
reading, the purpose of the proviso is to insulate elections from the 
inÁuence oI Poney and so allow WKe ouWcoPes oI elecWions Wo be 
guided by citizens’ political commitments weighted roughly equally, 
rather than by the political commitments of the wealthiest or most 
powerful citizens.126 The “limited space of the public political 
forum” refers to the limited space of electoral discourse, where there 
are a small number of discrete options to be debated by citizens.127 
This interpretation of Rawls’s proviso is attractive because the 
public facility consisting of elections and party politics is designed 
to “control the entry into positions of political authority,” and this 
facility needs protection to ensure that equal citizenship is not 
undermined over time.128
Additionally, narrowing the scope of Rawls’s proviso 
prevents it from becoming unworkable. Because beliefs about justice 
124 See supra notes 39, 50 and accompanying text.
125 See SKiffrin supra note 14, at 1670–71.
126 See id. at 1649.
127 See RƏƥƚơŽ supra note 4, at 150.
128 Id. at 149–50; see Robert C. Hughes, Responsive Government and Duties of 
Conscience, 5 JƣƠƗơſ 244, 245 (2014) (arguing that for a government to be 
democratic, “[c]itizens who regard the law as unjust and who diligently 
adYance a sensible arguPenW Ior cKanging iW PusW be MusWified in belieYing WKaW 
WKeir efforWs could in WiPe KelS Wo bring abouW WKe cKange WKey seek.µ.
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connect with so many other aspects of life, protecting the fair value 
of the political liberties under the broad reading might require 
guaranteeing, as a matter of the constitutional essentials, the fair 
value of all of the equal basic liberties. While we might worry about 
violations of the fair value of basic political liberties in contexts 
other than elections, proponents of the narrow reading might argue, 
such violations are unlikely to cascade into an entrenched advantage 
in the way that unfair control over electoral processes are. As long 
as the electoral processes remain fair, these processes can be used 
to reassert democratic control of other political institutions.129 If 
Rawls’s fair value proviso applies only to discrete political contests, 
it might be much less contentious than the proviso of semiotic 
justice, which cannot be limited in application to discrete contests 
because culture, for the most part, lacks contests with clear winners 
and losers.
In spite of its attractions, however, the narrow reading of 
Rawls’s fair value proviso should be rejected in favor of a broader 
understanding of the settings to which fair value applies. One 
aim of guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties “is to 
enable legislators and political parties to be independent of large 
concentrations of private economic and social power,” but the rationale 
for protecting the political liberties extends beyond elections.130 As 
donors seeking Wo inÁuence elecWions KaYe long reali]ed Poney can 
be used to help shape electoral outcomes even when it is not spent 
advocating for or against the election of particular candidates, but 
also when it is spent on ideological advocacy for certain political 
issues in the lead up to an election.131
If Rawls’s fair value proviso applies only to elections and 
other contest-like political activities, it could still be interpreted 
129 See AƚƓƦƏƜƒƓƠ Mſ %ƗƑƙƓƢƚŽ 7ƖƓ LƓƏơƢ DƏƜƕƓƠƝƣơ %ƠƏƜƑƖƌ 7ƖƓ 
SƣƞƠƓƛƓ &ƝƣƠƢ ƏƢ ƢƖƓ %ƏƠ ƝƔ 3ƝƚƗƢƗƑơ 18–19 (2d ed. 1986).
130 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 150; see Meena Krishnamurthy, &omSletinJ 5aZls·s 
ArJXment for (TXal Political /iberty and ,ts )air 9alXe 7he ArJXment from 6elf
Respect, 43 &ƏƜſ Jſ 3ƖƗƚſ 179, 199 (2013) (“[T]hough equal political liberty 
requires that equal voting rights are ensured, the fair value of political liberty 
requires more than this, that is, if each of those holding votes are to have 
eTually effecWiYe inÁuence oYer SoliWical decisionPaking.µ.
131 See Floyd Norris, A Fine Line Between Social and Political, 1ſ<ſ 7ƗƛƓơŽ May 17, 
 aW % noWing WKaW large nuPbers oI ´social welIareµ nonSrofiWs sSenW 
large amounts of money in the 2012 presidential election on advertisements 
“to promote issues” that “did not actually back a candidate” so that they 
“could qualify as . . . nonpolitical issue advertisement[s]”).
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expansively to limit the role that money can play in electioneering 
issue ads PeanW Wo inÁuence WKe ouWcoPes oI elecWions. +oweYer eYen 
WKis inWerSreWaWion is insuűcienWly broad. 7Ke ouWcoPes oI elecWions 
can be inÁuenced Pore indirecWly. As Jane Mayer Kas docuPenWed in 
the late twentieth-century United States, conservative organizations 
backed by wealthy donors sought to wage a battle of ideas to make 
libertarian free-market commitments more palatable to mainstream 
politicians.132 SoSKisWicaWed conserYaWiYe IoundaWions sougKW Wo affecW 
SoliWical ouWcoPes noW MusW by inÁuencing YoWers buW by inMecWing WKeir 
ideological sWances inWo uniYersiWies WKink Wanks and nonSrofiWs.133 
Even if one rejects the empirical details of Mayer’s account of the 
inÁuence oI conserYaWiYe IoundaWions on APerican SoliWics WKe 
possibility that a democracy’s political culture can be reshaped by 
wealthy individuals or institutions suggests that the guarantee of 
the fair value of the political liberties should be expanded beyond 
elecWions and SarWy SoliWics. 7Ke e[ercise oI WKe firsW Poral Sower 
is just as imperiled by the possibility that a whole political culture 
can be inÁuenced by Poney as by WKe SossibiliWy WKaW elecWions 
can be inÁuenced. ,nWerSreWing Rawls·s SroYiso Wo consWiWuWionally 
guarantee the fair value of the political liberties in all the domains of 
life in which political values are collectively formulated and contested 
ensures that a democracy’s political culture cannot be compromised 
by the powerful.134
The broad interpretation of Rawls’s proviso advanced here 
still regards politics as a competition about political values, where 
succeeding at the competition means having one’s political values 
accepted by the community. Similarly, culture is a competition about 
access to a space that people pay attention to. In the limited public 
facility of culture, people compete to articulate their ideas of the 
132 See generally JƏƜƓ MƏƧƓƠ, DƏƠƙ MƝƜƓƧƌ 7ƖƓ +ƗƒƒƓƜ +ƗơƢƝƠƧ ƝƔ ƢƖƓ 
%ƗƚƚƗƝƜƏƗƠƓơ %ƓƖƗƜƒ ƢƖƓ RƗơƓ ƝƔ ƢƖƓ RƏƒƗƑƏƚ RƗƕƖƢ (2016).
133 See id. at 93, 102, 156; see also JƝƖƜ Jſ MƗƚƚƓƠŽ SƢƠƏƢƓƕƗƑ ,ƜƤƓơƢƛƓƜƢ ƗƜ 
,ƒƓƏơƌ +Ɲƥ 7ƥƝ FƝƣƜƒƏƢƗƝƜơ RƓơƖƏƞƓƒ AƛƓƠƗƑƏ 17 (2003), https://
www.SKilanWKroSyroundWable.orgdocsdeIaulWsourceguidebookfilesKowB
WwoBIoundaWionsBresKaSedBaPerica.SdI"sIYrsn aB Sraising WKe 
John M. Olin foundation for its success at bringing about long-term change 
in WKe 8niWed SWaWes· SoliWical culWure by using iWs financial clouW Wo esWablisK 
“beachheads at the nation’s elite colleges and universities”).
134 The domain of politics still has “limited space” under this interpretation 
because there is a limited amount of attention that the members of a 
community can devote to politics and justice. See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 150.
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good and of how best to live together.135 Just as the moral powers—
esSecially WKe firsW³would be coPSroPised iI Poney sKaSed WKe 
political ideas that a community collectively paid attention to, so 
too the second moral power would be compromised if a wealthy 
foundation or religious organization used its material resources to 
systematically alter a community’s beliefs about the good. To avoid 
this possibility, democracies should embrace the proviso of semiotic 
justice. 
Of course, political communities do not inescapably 
coordinate about the good, as they must coordinate about the right 
and about government. However, in a community that is committed 
to ensuring that everyone has an equal opportunity to form their 
own values and judgments of the good, some degree of coordination 
about the good is required to ensure that arbitrary entitlements do not 
leave some citizens with a much greater chance than others to form 
their own conception of the good. For this reason, semiotic justice 
PigKW be undersWood Wo reTuire PodificaWions Wo Rawls·s SoliWical 
conception of the person. For Rawls, the person is conceptualized 
as a free rational person reaching an agreement with other free 
rational persons and is understood to reach a reciprocal agreement 
as a citizen with other citizens.136 The reciprocal cooperation that 
the members of a cooperating society agree upon is cooperation as 
citizens. Elevating cultural liberties to the level of a constitutional 
essenWial reÁecWs a concern wiWK soPeWKing oWKer WKan ciWi]ensKiS 
now a commitment to creating a space in which people can pursue 
and revise conceptions of the good with each other is on par with the 
political aims of Kantian persons.137 Rawls’s account of the parties 
to the original position as reciprocal cooperators might still be 
135 Claiming that culture is a competition is not to suggest that culture is merely 
a struggle for elevated social recognition or for fame. The contest of culture 
involves taking up existing cultural materials and amplifying, transforming, 
or destroying them. Culture is competitive because our views of the good 
life are typically about a good life together with other people rather than alone 
in the wilderness, and because the cultural resources that we take up and 
transform are shared resources. As success in the competitive space of politics 
is marked not by achieving power but by achieving one’s conception of justice, 
so success in the competitive space of culture is marked not by achieving 
fame but by achieving one’s conception of the good. See supra notes 82–88 and 
accompanying text.
136 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 16.
137 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 24, at 445 (“[T]he Kantian interpretation of the original 
position means that the desire to do what is right and just is the main way for 
persons to express their nature as free and equal rational beings.”).
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sustained, but the reciprocity cannot be simply reciprocity as citizens.
One might yet wonder whether culture requires the same 
sort of connection to the state that politics does: because of the role 
of the basic structure in allocating scarce resources and regulating 
inWerSersonal relaWionsKiSs WKe firsW Poral Sower cannoW be Sursued 
in isolaWion in a sPall enclaYe cuW off IroP WKe sWaWe. 3erKaSs WKe 
second Poral Sower in conWrasW Wo WKe firsW can be reali]ed in a 
subculture or a dissident culture that is largely disconnected from 
mainstream politics and culture.138 However, because pursuing 
a conception of the good typically requires access to material 
resources (cameras to make movies and the like), cultural source 
material to work with, and the capacity to impact others, the space 
of culture cannot be strictly segregated from the space of politics.139 
FurWKerPore wKile affordances Wo SarWiciSaWe in subculWures SroYide 
a way of exercising the second moral power, subcultural creation 
does not happen in a vacuum. The broader culture helps to shape 
what conceptions of the good are thinkable and unthinkable, even 
for the avant-garde.140 As soon as the state is involved in shaping 
the broad cultural landscape by creating schools and universities, 
regulating school curricula, and funding the arts, humanities, and 
sciences WKe SossibiliWy oI cordoning culWure off IroP SoliWics is losW.
2. Why Make Semiotic Justice a Constitutional Essential?
Rawls might respond to semiotic justice by arguing that 
there is no need to turn this additional proviso into a constitutional 
essential. The fair value of the political liberties is a constitutional 
essential because of the usefulness of these liberties in making the 
wKole basic sWrucWure IuncWion effecWiYely and MusWly.141 Rawls might 
KigKligKW Iour IeaWures oI MusWice as Iairness firsW guaranWees in WKe 
firsW SrinciSle oI IreedoP oI conscience second WKe likeliKood WKaW 
there would be some overlap in practice between semiotic justice 
and the guarantee of the fair value of the political liberties; third, 
WKe difference SrinciSle and IourWK WKe SrinciSle oI Iair eTualiWy oI 
138 See 3Əƣƚ GƗƚƠƝƧŽ 7ƖƓ %ƚƏƑƙ AƢƚƏƜƢƗƑƌ MƝƒƓƠƜƗƢƧ ƏƜƒ DƝƣƐƚƓ 
&ƝƜơƑƗƝƣơƜƓơơ 7 (1993); 3Əƣƚ &ſ 7ƏƧƚƝƠŽ %ƚƏƑƙ Ɨơ %ƓƏƣƢƗƔƣƚƌ A 
3ƖƗƚƝơƝƞƖƧ ƝƔ %ƚƏƑƙ AƓơƢƖƓƢƗƑơ 14–15 (2016).
139 See RƏƥƚơ, supra noWe  aW  ´>A@ suűcienW PaWerial basis Ior Sersonal 
independence and a sense of self-respect . . . are essential for the adequate 
development and exercise of the moral powers.”).
140 See RƝơƏƚƗƜƒ Eſ KƠƏƣơŽ 7ƖƓ 2ƠƗƕƗƜƏƚƗƢƧ ƝƔ ƢƖƓ AƤƏƜƢ GƏƠƒƓ ƏƜƒ 
2ƢƖƓƠ MƝƒƓƠƜƗơƢ MƧƢƖơ 162 (1986).
141 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 28.
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opportunity operating at the legislative stage.142 Rawls might ask 
why this set of factors is not good enough to ensure that the cultural 
liberties have their fair value. These guarantees, Rawls might insist, 
suűce Wo ensure WKaW eYeryone Kas WKe besW cKance Wo SarWiciSaWe 
in culture that they possibly could have, consistent with the other 
requirements of justice. For instance, fair equality of opportunity is 
precisely about the equal opportunity to fully and adequately develop 
and e[ercise WKe firsW and second Poral Sowers.143 Fair equality of 
opportunity would, therefore, likely require the legislature to adopt 
antitrust-like laws designed to counteract accumulations of cultural 
Sower. WKaW difference does iW Pake Wo SuW WKis inWo WKe consWiWuWion 
rather than to leave it to the legislative stage?
To understand the importance of constitutionalizing semiotic 
justice, consider why Rawls insists that the fair value proviso for the 
eTual SoliWical liberWies needs Wo be SarW oI WKe firsW SrinciSle raWKer 
than postponed to the legislative stage. Rawls suggests that the 
political liberties are of special importance, because “unless the fair 
value of these liberties is approximately preserved, just background 
institutions are unlikely to be either established or maintained.”144 
By guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties at the outset, 
before the legislative stage is reached, a society can ensure that 
everyone will be able to fairly participate in the legislative process.145 
If all citizens are able to have their voices heard by the legislature, 
this will ensure that “the [other] basic liberties are not merely 
formal.”146 Like Chief Justice Warren’s description of the right to vote 
freely as “preservative of other basic civil and political rights,”147 or 
John Hart Ely’s advocacy of “a representation-reinforcing approach 
to judicial review” that supports “the underlying premises of the 
American system of representative democracy,”148 the fair value of 
the equal political liberties is particularly urgent because it makes 
the political system work, which in turn ensures that the other basic 
liberties will be realized. The legislative stage cannot take care of 
the fair value of the political liberties if access to that stage is not 
itself fair. The reasons for treating the proviso of the fair value of the 
142 See id. at 44, 47, 61, 148.
143 Id. at 20.
144 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 6, at 327–28.
145 Id. at 330.
146 Id.
147 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
148 JƝƖƜ +ƏƠƢ EƚƧŽ DƓƛƝƑƠƏƑƧ ƏƜƒ DƗơƢƠƣơƢ 88 (1980).
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SoliWical liberWies as SarW oI WKe firsW SrinciSle and Kence as SarW oI 
the constitutional essentials, boils down to the claim that it is “more 
urgent to settle” the fair value of the political liberties than of the 
other basic liberties.149
My response to this objection has two parts. First, as I have 
argued above, the contours of culture shape what is politically 
possible. As the hypothetical society shot through with sex 
inequality that I describe above illustrates, an undemocratic culture 
can undermine the conditions necessary for democratic politics.150
Second, the fair value of the cultural liberties is particularly 
urgent because guaranteeing such liberties creates the conditions 
necessary for political philosophy to do its work. The political 
philosophizing that gives rise to the political conception of the 
person is worked up from the “public political culture of a democratic 
society, in its basic political texts (constitutions and declarations of 
human rights), and in the historical tradition of the interpretation of 
those texts.”151 If there are blind spots in the historical traditions in 
which justice as fairness goes to work, justice as fairness is likely to 
suffer IroP siPilar oYersigKWs.152
However, a commitment to making culture open and to 
allowing the conditions against which political philosophy grows up 
to be contested by all of the people of a cooperating society, provides 
an avenue to address these oversights. Interventions in culture can 
bring to light previously unrecognized ways of life,153 providing 
resources with which individuals may develop their conceptions 
of the good and showing philosophers where political philosophy 
should play its “realistically utopian” role, “probing the limits of 
practical political possibility.”154 Cultural participation is the sort 
of expression that creates the conditions of awareness that political 
149 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 49.
150 See supra notes 89–98 and accompanying text.
151 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 19.
152 One piece of evidence for this claim is that Rawls’s theory of justice has 
IreTuenWly been criWici]ed Ior Iailing Wo Say suűcienW aWWenWion Wo global MusWice 
see, e.g., 7ƖƝƛƏơ Wſ 3ƝƕƕƓŽ WƝƠƚƒ 3ƝƤƓƠƢƧ ƏƜƒ +ƣƛƏƜ RƗƕƖƢơƌ 
&ƝơƛƝƞƝƚƗƢƏƜ RƓơƞƝƜơƗƐƗƚƗƢƗƓơ ƏƜƒ RƓƔƝƠƛơ 104–08 (2002), 
women’s rights, see, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, -Xstice and *ender An UnÀnished 
Debate, 72 FƝƠƒƖƏƛ Lſ RƓƤſ 1537 (2004), and disability, see, e.g., Martha C. 
Nussbaum, &aSabilities and Disabilities -Xstice for 0entally Disabled &iti]ens, 30 
3ƖƗƚſ 7ƝƞƗƑơ 133 (2002), all topics that have historically been overlooked in 
the history of elite American political discourse.
153 See RƗƑƖƏƠƒ RƝƠƢƧŽ &ƝƜƢƗƜƕƓƜƑƧŽ ,ƠƝƜƧŽ ƏƜƒ SƝƚƗƒƏƠƗƢƧ 94 (1989).
154 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 4.
439VOL. 11, NO. 2 NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
philosophy can then work to incorporate, seeking out voices that 
cannot be understood in the realm of political philosophy unless 
WKey are firsW arWiculaWed in culWural sSace. For insWance Julie &oKen 
discusses how the “to and fro” play of culture, which is “neither 
entirely random nor wholly ordered . . . supplies the unexpected 
inputs to creative processes, fuels serendipitous consumption 
by situated users, and inclines audiences toward the new.”155 The 
unpredictability of culture’s movements in response to inputs 
provides a further resource for destabilizing and rethinking political 
theory.
Guaranteeing the fair value of the cultural liberties is of 
similar urgency to guaranteeing the fair value of the political 
liberties because the cultural background against which politics 
works, and which informs its conception of the person, determines 
what sort of institutional arrangements appear reasonable from the 
perspective of politics. Guaranteeing the fair value of the cultural 
liberties ensures that the ability to develop and pursue conceptions 
of the good is a real opportunity to do so, rather than merely an 
opportunity to endorse the prevailing conceptions of the good in a 
cooperative society.
3. Is Semiotic Justice Socially Divisive?
A third objection to semiotic justice is that guaranteeing the 
fair value of basic liberties other than the equal political liberties 
is socially divisive because it requires committing to a particular 
conception of the good. 
To the contrary, semiotic justice does not articulate a 
preference for certain conceptions of the good over others within the 
space of culture that it opens up. This is not to say that semiotic justice 
is indifferenW aPong all Sossible conceSWions oI WKe good iW e[cludes 
conceptions of the good that require a closed or static culture.156 
However, within the space of permissible cultural contestation, 
semiotic justice need not make controversial suppositions about 
the good life. Semiotic justice does not assume that participating in 
culture is necessarily an important and valuable part of individuals’ 
lives, but instead supposes that citizens who wish to pursue their 
own conception of the good need a cultural environment that is 
155 Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 8ſ&ſ DƏƤƗơ Lſ RƓƤſ 
1151, 1191–92 (2007).
156 See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
440 Gingerich
conducive to that pursuit.157 JusWice as Iairness idenWifies cerWain 
´worWKyµ IorPs oI liIe and SroYides suűcienW sSace wiWKin iWselI Ior 
those ways of life while also excluding other forms of life.158 This 
is permissible for Rawls because the exclusion of some ways of life 
is based on a political conception of justice that is, “or could be, 
shared by citizens generally regarded as free and equal” and “do[es] 
not presuppose any particular fully (or partially) comprehensive 
doctrine.”159 Semiotic justice’s preferences for certain forms of life 
are likewise rooted in the political conception of the person as having 
WKe firsW and second Poral Sowers raWKer WKan in any coPPiWPenW 
to a particular comprehensive conception of the good. Semiotic 
justice sets up a space of culture, and while it may foreclose the 
development of conceptions of the good outside of that space, it 
coPPiWs Wo allowing all oI WKe differenW conceSWions oI WKe good WKaW 
are able Wo fiW wiWKin WKaW sSace Wo Slay ouW againsW one anoWKer.
III. SEMIOTIC JUSTICE AND LAW
This article has argued that, given several plausible descriptive 
assuPSWions abouW WKe SoliWical econoPy oI culWure Rawls·s firsW 
principle of justice must guarantee semiotic justice.160 Just as the fair 
value of the political liberties is among the constitutional essentials 
of a liberal society governed by justice as fairness, so too is the fair 
Yalue oI WKe culWural liberWies. 7Kis ePendaWion oI WKe firsW SrinciSle 
is necessary to constitutionally guarantee that a nation’s culture is 
controlled democratically, rather than by the wealthy or the powerful. 
In this Part, I turn to the question of what it means, in practice, to 
respect the fair value of the cultural liberties. 
Adding items to Rawls’s list of constitutional essentials is 
no siPSle PaWWer Ior Rawls·s firsW SrinciSle reTuires noW WKaW eacK 
person have a right to each of the equal basic liberties but that each 
person have a right to “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties” 
that is compatible with everyone else having the same scheme of 
liberties.161 The items included among the constitutional essentials 
Pay Wrade off wiWK one anoWKer and are WreaWed as eTually significanW 
157 Cf. SKiffrin supra note 14, at 1667 (advancing a similar argument that 
guaranteeing the fair equality of opportunity in employment does not rely on 
“controversial assumptions about the nature of the good for individuals”).
158 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 155 n.30.
159 Id. at 141.
160 See supra Section II(A)(1)–(2).
161 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 42–43 (emphasis added).
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wKen WKey coPe inWo conÁicW.162 Any resoluWion oI SracWical conÁicWs 
among the constitutional essentials that maintains a scheme of 
constitutional essentials that is as conducive as possible to every 
citizen’s realization and development of the moral powers and that 
saWisfies WKe dePands oI Sublic reason PeeWs WKe reTuirePenWs 
of constitutional legitimacy.163 Thus, it does not immediately 
follow from adding the fair value of cultural liberties to the list of 
constitutional essentials that a political community’s laws must be 
revised in order to be legitimate. To determine what revisions to a 
partially just society’s laws and political institutions would satisfy 
the requirements of semiotic justice, one must consider whether 
the totality of the society’s laws adequately enable citizens to 
develop the two moral powers by providing them with a scheme 
that includes the each of the formal equal basic liberties, a basic 
social minimum, the fair value of the political liberties, and the fair 
value of cultural liberties, where all of these liberties are regarded as 
eTually significanW.164
Like justice as fairness, the constitutional requirements 
of semiotic justice are multiply realizable.165 For this reason, the 
significance oI sePioWic MusWice Ior consWiWuWionPaking legislaWing 
and adjudication can best be understood by examining cases that 
present failures of semiotic justice and considering the reforms 
that might bring a constitutional order into compliance with the 
requirements of justice as fairness, generally, and the semiotic justice 
SroYiso sSecifically. 7Kree cases are SresenWed WKaW illusWraWe Iailures 
of semiotic justice and discuss the range of policy reforms that might 
bring the constitutional order elucidated by each of these cases more 
closely into alignment with the requirements of semiotic justice. 
These cases highlight the range of disparate laws and institutions 
162 See id. at 149. But see SKiffrin supra note 14, at 1672 (arguing that “the idea 
that whether something is a constitutional essential or not is co-extensive 
with its place in the system of lexical priority” may be mistaken).
163 Michelman, supra note 87, at 195.
164 Here, I follow Frank Michelman in regarding not only written constitutions but 
also the “governmental totality” of “the entire aggregate of concrete political 
and legal institutions, practices, laws, and legal interpretations currently in 
force or occurrent in the country” as potentially relevant to assessing the 
legitimation-worthiness of a society’s constitution. Frank I. Michelman, ,da·s 
:ay &onstrXctinJ the 5esSect:orthy *oYernmental 6ystem, 72 FƝƠƒƖƏƛ Lſ RƓƤſ 
345, 347 (2003).
165 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 138 (noting that the principles of justice can be 
saWisfied in a range oI econoPic regiPes including boWK ´SroSerWyowning 
democracy” and “liberal socialism”).
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that play a role in guaranteeing or undermining the fair value of the 
cultural liberties. Together, these cases show how the requirements 
of semiotic justice intersect not only with constitutional law, but also 
with features of private law that often appear politically “neutral.” 
A full evaluation of the reforms surveyed in response to each of 
these cases is beyond the scope of this Article, as is an assessment 
of the reforms’ political feasibility; rather, the aim is to model how 
semiotic justice provides a “template against which to assess our 
achievements” and “a norm against to which to assess what we have 
neglected and failed to protect.”166
A. #OscarsSoWhite: Race Discrimination and Cultural 
Accolades
In 2016, for the second year in a row, exclusively white actors 
were nominated for Oscar awards by the Academy of Motion Picture 
ArWs and Sciences. A significanW nuPber oI criWically acclaiPed filPs 
with minority directors and notable performances by black actors 
were eligible for the 2016 Oscars, including Creed, Straight Outta 
Compton, Chi-raq, and Beasts of No Nation.167 Straight Outta 
Compton, directed by and starring African-Americans but written 
by a team of white screenwriters, was nominated only for Best 
Original Screenplay.168 Protestors objected that the mono-racial 
Oscar nominations failed to honor the contributions of minority 
actors, directors, and writers to cinema in 2015.169 The complaint of 
protestors was not that the Academy violated state or federal anti-
discriPinaWion laws nor did acWors and filPPakers wKo boycoWWed WKe 
awards ceremony seek interventions from lawmakers or politicians 
to address discrimination in Oscar nominations.170 Nonetheless, the 
phenomenon of #OscarsSoWhite represents a failure of semiotic 
justice.
To see why the fact that the Academy of Motion Picture 
Arts and Sciences nominated exclusively white actors for Academy 
166 Martha C. Nussbaum, )oreZord &onstitXtions and &aSabilities ´PerceStionµ 
Against Lofty Formalism, 121 +ƏƠƤſ Lſ RƓƤſ 4, 8 (2007).
167 Gray, supra note 1.
168 See id.
169 Jack Shepherd, 2scars  (Yeryone :ho %oycotted the Academy AZards and :hy, 
from Jada Pinkett Smith to Spike Lee, ,ƜƒƓƞƓƜƒƓƜƢ (Feb. 28, 2016, 21:47 GMT), 
KWWSwww.indeSendenW.co.ukarWsenWerWainPenWfilPsnewsoscars
everyone-boycotting-the-academy-awards-and-why-from-jada-pinkett-smith-
to-spike-lee-a6902121.html; Ng, supra note 1.
170 See Ng, supra note 1.
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Awards in 2015 and 2016 provides prima facie evidence of a failure 
of the constitutional order of the United States to guarantee the 
fair value of the cultural liberties, several additional premises are 
required. First, the Academy Awards serve as the most visible 
institutional gatekeeper of cinematic prestige in the United States.171 
Such prestige is connected to, but partially independent from, the 
econoPics oI WKe filP indusWry. For insWance WKe AcadePy does noW 
siPSly resSond Wo econoPic indicaWors wKen deciding wKicK filPs 
and SerIorPances Wo noPinaWe Ior 2scars³in IacW WKe filPs WKaW 
Pake WKe PosW Poney aW WKe bo[ oűce oIWen are noW considered 
“Oscar material.”172 Winning or being nominated for an Oscar can 
KelS a filP sell WickeWs buW WKese accolades also SroYide a sSecial sorW 
oI culWural recogniWion and canoni]aWion Ior filPs Paking iW Pore 
likely WKaW audiences and oWKer filPPakers will Say aWWenWion Wo and 
be inÁuenced by a filP.173 In this institutional and cultural context, 
mono-racial Oscar nominations constitute a failure of semiotic 
justice because the decision of the Academy not to nominate 
AIricanAPerican filPPakers or acWors boWK SroYides eYidence oI 
and causally conWribuWes Wo WKe inabiliWy oI PinoriWy filPPakers³
relaWiYe Wo wKiWe filPPakers³Wo SarWiciSaWe in sKaSing APerican 
cinematic culture.
It may be objected that no state action is involved—the 
Academy is a private association, conferring private honors—and 
so it is inapt to describe its failings as failings of justice. It might 
further be objected that even if the Academy’s failings are failings 
oI MusWice WKey cannoW affecW WKe legiWiPacy oI WKe 8niWed SWaWes· 
constitutional order.
While the Academy is indeed a private association, this is not 
171 See, e.g., Colleen Kennedy-Karpat, 7rash &inema and 2scar *old 4Xentin 7arantino, 
Intertextuality, and Industry Prestige, in AƒƏƞƢƏƢƗƝƜŽ AƥƏƠƒơ &ƣƚƢƣƠƓŽ ƏƜƒ 
ƢƖƓ VƏƚƣƓ ƝƔ 3ƠƓơƢƗƕƓ 173, 187 n.2 (Colleen Kennedy-Karpat & Eric 
Sandberg eds., 2017) (treating Academy Awards as the primary marker of 
prestige in Hollywood).
172 See K.K. Rebecca Lai & Jasmine C. Lee, %o[ 2űce +it or %est PictXre at the 2scars" 
You Can Rarely Have Both, 1ſ<ſ 7ƗƛƓơ (Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2018/03/03/movies/oscars-best-picture-box-office.html 
´+iW PoYies rarely go on Wo becoPe 2scar besW SicWure winners reÁecWing a 
difference in WasWe beWween PoYiegoers and filP indusWry SroIessionals. ,n WKe 
past 30 years, only four movies were named best picture while topping box 
oűce cKarWs.µ.
173 See Colleen Kennedy-Karpat & Eric Sandberg, Adaptation and Systems of Cultural 
Value, in AƒƏƞƢƏƢƗƝƜŽ AƥƏƠƒơ &ƣƚƢƣƠƓŽ ƏƜƒ ƢƖƓ VƏƚƣƓ ƝƔ 3ƠƓơƢƗƕƓ, 
supra note 171, at 1, 5.
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enough to settle the question of whether its decisions in nominating 
filPs Ior 2scars can counW as a Iailure oI MusWice. 7Ke AcadePy·s 
actions constitute one small part of the basic structure and thus only 
constitute a small part of the failure of semiotic justice in this case.174 
It is not the failure of the Academy by itself that constitutes a failure 
of constitutional legitimacy, but the total arrangement of laws and 
political institutions that make it possible for the Academy to exercise 
a great deal of gatekeeping power over cinematic prestige together 
with the revealed preference of the Academy’s members to exclude 
minority actors from access to the prestige-conferring Oscars. Even 
if the Academy is not part of the basic structure, the failure of the 
Academy to nominate minority actors provides evidence of a failure 
by the state to respect semiotic justice. A culture in which minority 
acWors and filPPakers do noW KaYe Iair eTual access Wo WKe Pain 
Parkers oI culWural SresWige in WKe filP world is a culWure WKaW Iails aW 
reciprocity, and failures of reciprocity indicate that a constitutional 
order is illegitimate.175
Consider the following three reforms that the legal 
and political institutions of the United States (e.g., Congress, 
legislatures, state and federal courts, and state and federal agencies) 
could implement in response to #OscarsSoWhite in order to bring 
the American constitutional order closer to legitimation-worthiness.
First, Congress and state legislatures or state and federal 
courts could extend anti-discrimination laws to prohibit racial 
discriPinaWion in WKe SroYision oI oűces and awards Keld ouW Wo WKe 
public as honors to be respected.176 Congress and state legislatures 
174 SoPe oI WKe PosW SroPinenW acWors and filPPakers Wo boycoWW WKe  2scars 
including Jada Pinkett-Smith and Spike Lee, invoked the memory of Martin 
Luther King in explaining their decision to boycott. See Shepherd, supra note 
169. King, whose campaigns served as an exemplary touchstone for Rawls’s 
conceptions of justice as fairness and political liberalism, targeted economic 
elites, social organizations like churches, and ordinary citizens “because he 
conceived of justice as a virtue of persons and civil society, as well as the state 
or the ‘basic structure’ of society.” Brandon M. Terry, Critical Race Theory 
and the Tasks of Political Philosophy: On Rawls and “The Racial Contract” 29 
n.d. unSublisKed PanuscriSW on file wiWK WKe auWKor. As King recogni]ed 
the basic structure of society is inextricable from the organization of private 
institutions and the dispositions of private citizens. See id.
175 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 6, at 137.
176 For instance, California could amend its Unruh Civil Rights Act, which states 
that all persons are “entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of any kind 
whatsoever” regardless of their race. &Əƚſ &ƗƤſ &ƝƒƓ § 51(b) (Deering 
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could, at the same time, modify anti-discrimination laws to allow 
disparate impact—rather than disparate treatment—to establish a 
violation of these laws.177 This strategy would aim to ensure that the 
2scars Konor Pore diYerse filPPakers and acWors in order Wo aYoid 
liability for violating state or federal anti-discrimination law.
Second, the federal or state governments could provide a 
universal basic income,178 institute more progressive property and 
income taxes,179 provide reparations for slavery to the descendants of 
slaves,180 and increase investments in arts and humanities education 
in public schools and universities so that the writing and artistic 
skills needed Wo conWribuWe Wo filP are Pore widely accessible.181 This 
suite of reforms would aim to change the behavior of the Academy 
Awards indirectly. By helping to equalize the purchasing power of 
minority and white movie audiences, these wealth transfers would 
address the possibility that the decision of the Academy to honor 
SredoPinanWly wKiWe filPPakers reÁecWs audience SreIerences wiWK 
wKiWe audiences e[ercising disSroSorWionaWe inÁuence because oI 
their greater disposable incomes that enable them to spend more on 
movie tickets, rentals, and purchases.
2019). The California legislature could add a clause entitling all persons to 
Iull and eTual SriYileges IroP ´all organi]aWions offering oűces and awards 
that are held out to the public as honors to be respected.” Alternatively, the 
California courts could interpret “all business establishments of every kind 
whatsoever” to include the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences’ 
Academy Awards and interpret “full and equal . . . privileges” to include 
nomination and selection for Academy Awards. See id.
177 See Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GƓƝſ LſJſ 1133, 1135–36 (2010) 
(describing the importance of disparate impact claims); see also Ann C. 
McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano DilXtinJ DisSarate ,mSact and 5edeÀninJ DisSarate 
Treatment, 628 1ƓƤſ LſJſ 626, 629–35 (2012) (describing the distinction 
between disparate impact and disparate treatment in contemporary federal 
anti-discrimination law).
178 See 3ƖƗƚƗƞƞƓ VƏƜ 3ƏƠƗƘơ ż <ƏƜƜƗƑƙ VƏƜƒƓƠƐƝƠƕƖƢŽ %ƏơƗƑ ,ƜƑƝƛƓƌ 
A RƏƒƗƑƏƚ 3ƠƝƞƝơƏƚ ƔƝƠ Ə FƠƓƓ SƝƑƗƓƢƧ ƏƜƒ Ə SƏƜƓ EƑƝƜƝƛƧ 5–28 
(2017) (articulating a concrete proposal for implementing a universal basic 
income).
179 See Thomas Piketty, ProSerty, ,neTXality, and 7a[ation 5eÁections on &aSital in the 
Twenty-First Century, 68 7ƏƦſ Lſ RƓƤſ 631, 638–41 (2015); see also C. Ronald 
Chester, Inheritance and Wealth Taxation in a Just Society, 30 RƣƢƕƓƠơ Lſ RƓƤſ 
62, 66–72 (1976).
180 See %ƝƠƗơ ,ſ %ƗƢƢƙƓƠŽ 7ƖƓ &ƏơƓ ƔƝƠ %ƚƏƑƙ RƓƞƏƠƏƢƗƝƜơ 8–29 (2d 
ed. 2003); see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., 5eSairinJ the Past NeZ (fforts in 
the Reparations Debate in America, 38 +ƏƠƤſ &ſRſ&ſLſ Lſ RƓƤſ 279, 294–308 
(2003).
181 See SƓƔƏƜ &ƝƚƚƗƜƗŽ SƞƓƏƙƗƜƕ ƝƔ 8ƜƗƤƓƠơƗƢƗƓơ 193–205 (2017).
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Third, Congress could establish and fund a National 
Endowment for Film with a mandate to honor and promote excellence 
in the cinematic arts and directions to establish an annual awards 
SrograP Ior e[cellence in filPPaking and acWing.182 This strategy 
would aim not to change the behavior of the Academy of Motion 
Picture Arts and Sciences but instead to change the Academy’s role 
in the culture of the contemporary United States, displacing it as the 
primary gatekeeper of cinematic prestige so that its failure to honor 
minority actors would not prevent minority actors from having a 
roughly equal opportunity to participate in the shared culture. This 
reform strategy would not render a failure of the Academy to honor 
diverse actors morally permissible, but it would help to establish a 
more legitimate constitutional order.
These three reform strategies demonstrate how semiotic 
justice, like justice as fairness more generally, is multiply realizable: 
WKere are differenW SoinWs oI inWerYenWion in WKe legalconsWiWuWional 
scKePa eacK oI wKicK would KaYe a soPewKaW differenW effecW on 
the legitimacy of the constitution. Because semiotic justice elevates 
the fair value of the cultural liberties to the level of a constitutional 
essential, the fair value of the cultural liberties has the same priority 
as the formal basic liberties, including the right to free speech.183 
7Ke firsW reIorP oSWion PenWioned aboYe wKicK inYolYes e[Sanding 
anti-discrimination law to directly regulate the Academy’s decisions 
of which movies to honor, might be objected to on the grounds that 
it interferes with the Academy’s freedom of speech (or with the 
freedom of speech of its members). However, because the formal 
liberty of free speech and the fair value of the cultural liberties both 
number among the constitutional essentials according to semiotic 
justice, this objection is not decisive. In Rawls’s view, the Supreme 
Court erred in Buckley v. Valeo when it struck down the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971’s limits on election spending as 
violating the First Amendment.184 While the limits on election 
spending restricted the formal liberty of free speech, such limits 
advanced the fair value of the equal political liberties by ensuring 
WKaW ciWi]ens KaYe rougKly eTual oSSorWuniWies Wo inÁuence elecWoral 
outcomes, regardless of wealth.185
182 Cf. FƗơƖƓƠ, supra note 13, at 200 (discussing direct government funding for 
the production of public goods).
183 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 46–47, 104–06.
184 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976); RƏƥƚơ, supra note 6, at 359–63.
185 RƏƥƚơ, supra note 6, at 449; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23. Because the equal 
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Likewise, treating the formal liberty of free speech as settling 
WKe TuesWion oI wKeWKer WKe AcadePy·s decisions oI wKicK filPs 
to honor can be regulated by anti-discrimination laws would be to 
privilege formal rights over other rights—namely, the fair value of 
the cultural liberties—that are equally important for the two moral 
powers. Restricting the formal free speech rights of the Academy 
might be precisely what is needed to ensure that citizens have roughly 
equal opportunities to accrue cinematic prestige and recognition. On 
the other hand, the formal liberty of free speech might require that 
WKe second or WKird reIorP sWraWegy be adoSWed insWead oI WKe firsW aW 
leasW insoIar as WKe firsW sWraWegy resWricWs IreedoP oI e[Sression WKaW 
is Yaluable Ior WKe firsW and second Poral Sowers.186 7Ke differenW 
reIorP sWraWegies WKaW , KaYe skeWcKed enWail differenW baskeWs oI 
formal basic liberties and substantive political and cultural liberties; 
settling on which reform schemes semiotic justice endorses requires 
determining which schemes, if any, adequately guarantee access to 
all the equal basic liberties.
Fair equality of opportunity would propose exactly the same 
sort of legal reforms that semiotic justice suggests, except that the 
legal reforms proposed by the fair equality of opportunity might be 
more tightly constrained by the need to respect the formal equal basic 
liberties, including the freedom of speech. However, Rawls’s principle 
of fair equality of opportunity fails to treat the case of #OscarsSoWhite 
as involving the issue of legitimacy.187 This is a mistake on Rawls’s 
part, because, like the fair value of the equal political liberties, the 
Iair Yalue oI WKe culWural liberWies is a field in wKicK WKe Iailure oI 
reciSrociWy can KaYe widesSread downsWreaP effecWs inIecWing our 
very ability to theorize a good culture.188 Furthermore, while the 
#OscarsSoWhite case concerns discrimination along the lines of a 
protected category (i.e., race), semiotic justice demands equal access 
basic liberties should be understood in association with one another, the point 
might also be put in another way: on the best understanding of the formal 
liberty of free speech, the right of free speech does not include a right to make 
unlimited campaign expenditures. A right to free speech that does not include 
such a right to make campaign expenditures is not a “compromised” formal 
right of free speech—it is simply the best understanding of the meaning of free 
speech.
186 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 41, 45.
187 See, e.g., 7ƖƝƛƏơ Wſ 3ƝƕƕƓŽ RƓƏƚƗƨƗƜƕ RƏƥƚơ ² . SKiffrin·s 
reading oI Iair eTualiWy oI oSSorWuniWy is a noWable e[ceSWion. SKiffrin supra 
note 14, at 1660.
188 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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on the ground of the right at issue, rather than on the basis of the 
classificaWion WKaW IorPs WKe basis Ior WKe discriPinaWion. ,n WKis 
sense, the constitutional question posed by semiotic justice is more 
one oI ´IundaPenWal rigKWsµ WKan one oI ´susSecW classificaWionsµ in 
the vocabulary of American constitutional jurisprudence.189
B. Copyright Law and Appropriation Art
The following cases about an appropriation artist will help to 
further distinguish the reform agenda of semiotic justice from that 
of Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity190:
Morgan, a semi-professional Los Angeles artist, 
creaWes a screenSrinWed 7SKirW riűng on an iconic 
photograph of a surfer catching a wave, taken a decade 
ago by Quinn, one of Morgan’s favorite professional 
photographers. Morgan uses a digital image of the 
photograph as a reference image when she designs 
Ker 7sKirW buW Podifies iW KeaYily rePoYing PucK 
of the detail present in the photograph and adding 
visual elements that call attention to what Morgan 
regards as WKe WySically oYerlooked inÁuence oI Sunk 
rock on Quinn’s photographic aesthetic, as well as 
other images and text referring to the history of street 
art in Los Angeles. Morgan makes twenty copies of 
the T-shirt and sells half of them, for thirty dollars 
each, at a semi-commercial street-art festival. Quinn 
happens to attend the festival and sees Morgan’s 
T-shirt; the following day, Quinn’s attorney contacts 
Morgan demanding that she cease production of the 
T-shirts, destroy her existing inventory, and turn 
oYer Ker SrofiWs Slus a  licensing SayPenW Wo 
Quinn. Morgan believes that her T-shirt constitutes 
189 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (striking down a law 
prohibiting inter-racial marriage on the basis of both the suspect nature of 
racial classificaWions and a IundaPenWal rigKW Wo Parry.
190 Appropriation art “takes over pre-existing images to re-employ them unchanged 
in a differenW conWe[W or wiWK a differenW SurSose in Pind WKus alWering >WKeir@ 
meaning.” EƒƥƏƠƒ LƣƑƗƓSƛƗƢƖŽ 7ƖƓ 7ƖƏƛƓơ ż +ƣƒơƝƜ DƗƑƢƗƝƜƏƠƧ 
ƝƔ AƠƢ 7ƓƠƛơ 17 (2d ed. 2004); see also SƗƛƝƜ WƗƚơƝƜ ż JƓơơƗƑƏ LƏƑƙŽ 
7ƖƓ 7ƏƢƓ GƣƗƒƓ ƢƝ MƝƒƓƠƜ AƠƢ 7ƓƠƛơ ² sW ed.  offering 
a siPilar definiWion oI aSSroSriaWion arW buW noWing WKaW aSSroSriaWion can 
involve not just existing works of art but any “real object”).
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a fair use of Quinn’s image,191 but after speaking 
with a lawyer, she learns that determining whether 
her T-shirt is a fair use is a fact-intensive inquiry 
that would likely be settled only after discovery if 
Quinn were to sue.192 Moreover, she learns that if a 
court determined that her T-shirt were not a fair use, 
Quinn could be awarded both a disgorgement of her 
Piniscule SrofiWs and sWaWuWory daPages SerKaSs 
in the tens of thousands of dollars, if it proved 
diűculW Ior KiP Wo esWablisK acWual daPages.193 Quinn 
might even be awarded attorney’s fees and costs, on 
top of damages.194 Morgan believes that there is a 
ninety percent likelihood that she would prevail at 
trial on a fair use defense, but because of the cost of 
retaining a lawyer and the risk of losing a trial and 
being bankrupted, Morgan decides she does not want 
to chance it.195 SKe offers Wo license WKe iPage IroP 
Quinn for a reasonable fee, and even to turn over all 
SrofiWs IroP WKe sKirW Wo 4uinn since sKe is Pore 
concerned about disseminating her art than making 
money from it. But Quinn refuses to entertain the 
possibility of a license, telling Morgan, through 
his attorney, “I decide when and where my art gets 
displayed. Anyway, punk is a crap aesthetic and I want 
191 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2017) (fair use provision of U.S. copyright law).
192 See, e.g., Sony Corp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 
n.31 (1984) (describing fair use as “an equitable rule of reason”); DC Comics, 
Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The four [fair use] 
factors listed in [17 U.S.C.] Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . 
. are normally questions for the jury.”).
193 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2017) (providing for actual damages for copyright 
inIringePenW in addiWion Wo disgorgePenW oI inIringer·s SrofiWs  8.S.&. 
§ 504(c)(1) (providing that a copyright owner may elect to receive statutory 
damages rather than actual damages, to be awarded in an amount between 
 and  Ser work  8.S.&.  c SroYiding WKaW sWaWuWory 
daPages Pay be increased uS Wo WKe aPounW oI  Ser work in WKe case 
of copyright infringement “committed willfully”).
194 See 17 U.S.C. § 505.
195 Cf. Meir Feder Edwin FounWain 	 Geoffrey SWewarW :hat·s :ronJ Zith the 
Copyright Regime, in William W. Fisher, Frank Cost, Shepard Fairey, Meir Feder, 
Edwin FounWain Geoffrey SWewarW 	 MariWa SWurken 5eÁections on the +oSe 
Poster Case, 25 +ƏƠƤſ Jſ Lſ ż 7ƓƑƖ. 243, 298–305 (2012) (noting that jury 
trials can be particularly risky for copyright defendants asserting a fair use 
defense because of jury bias against people who copy the work of others).
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nothing to do with it.” Feeling that she has no other 
choice, Morgan negotiates a settlement with Quinn’s 
lawyer, agreeing to cease production of her T-shirt, 
desWroy Ker inYenWory Wurn oYer all oI Ker SrofiWs IroP 
selling the shirt, and issue a public apology.196
This case might initially seem less like a violation of semiotic 
justice than the case of #OscarsSoWhite. In the Oscars case, Academy 
PePbers Iailed Wo Wake PinoriWy acWors and filPPakers seriously 
as contributors to cinematic culture: where reciprocity requires a 
serious engagement with the cultural contributions of minority 
acWors and filPPakers WKere was insWead racial bias. ,n WKis case 
the problem is not that Quinn is unwilling to entertain Morgan’s 
contribution to artistic culture. He does not like her T-shirt’s “punk 
aesthetic,” but his rejection of a licensing agreement does not result 
from racial or gender discrimination against Morgan. To see why this 
story about appropriation art also demonstrates a failure of semiotic 
justice, we need to consider the broader socio-legal context of the 
interaction between Quinn and Morgan. 
Copyright law confers on creators an exclusive, property-like 
entitlement “to prepare derivative works based upon” the work in 
which they hold a copyright.197 In the case described above, Quinn 
exercises this right to regulate the conditions under which later 
entrants can contribute to the culture, restricting Morgan from 
making a T-shirt highlighting what she sees as the continuities 
between punk and Quinn’s photographic style. The failure of semiotic 
MusWice does noW coPe IroP WKe oneoff inWeracWion beWween Morgan 
and Quinn, or even from the Copyright Act in isolation. Rather, the 
combination of many elements, including the breadth of copyright 
entitlements, the fact sensitivity of fair use determinations, the cost 
of hiring intellectual property lawyers and defending a lawsuit to 
the point of summary judgment, the absence of a strong welfare 
net providing insurance against the risk of a massive civil damages 
award, and the potential non-dischargability of copyright damages 
196 While this case is hypothetical, its general shape is taken from a copyright 
dispute in which the author represented an appropriation artist in settlement 
negotiations. Some elements of the hypothetical are also drawn from the 
“Hope Poster” case, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09-01123, 2009 WL 
319564, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011), in which, as a law student, the author 
served as a member of Shepard Fairey’s pro bono legal team.
197 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2017).
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in bankruptcy,198 collectively confer a broad discretionary power 
on incumbent creators as a class to control which creative works 
WKaW aSSroSriaWe or riff on WKe incuPbenWs· works can legally be 
distributed to wide audiences. As a result, the formal rights of cultural 
participation are more useful to the class of incumbent creators, the 
group most likely to compose a non-democratic cultural elite, than 
to the class of new artistic creators, violating the guarantee of the 
fair value of the cultural liberties.
It might be objected to semiotic justice that any system of 
copyright law gives an entitlement to incumbent creators, and that 
semiotic justice reaches too far in claiming that fact patterns like the 
vignette about Morgan and Quinn provide evidence of an illegitimate 
constitution. However, the problem with American copyright law, 
from the standpoint of semiotic justice, is not just that it provides 
incumbent artists with the right to be compensated for uses of their 
works—the problem is the arbitrary control conferred on incumbent 
creators. The present system of copyright law fails to respect the 
capacity of new creators (relative to incumbent creators) to make 
contributions to culture. This failure of respect is clearest in cases in 
which conferring an entitlement on copyright holders does nothing 
to incentivize creative activity.199
&onsider WKe Iollowing fiYe reIorP sWraWegies wKicK illusWraWe 
the range of legal reforms—some, but not all of which directly 
involve copyright law—that might be adopted in responses to cases 
like that of Morgan and Quinn to make the American constitutional 
order more legitimate.
198 See Star’s Edge, Inc. v. Braun (In re Braun), 327 B.R. 447, 450 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
2005) (“Statutory damages for copyright infringement are also indicative of 
injury and, therefore, are nondischargeable in bankruptcy.”); Feder, Fountain 
& Stewart, supra note 195, at 312.
199 In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court upheld the Copyright Term Extension 
Act, which extended the duration of copyright from “creation until 70 years 
after the author’s death.” 537 U.S. 186, 195–98 (2003). Congress extended 
the term in spite of the fact that “from a rational economic perspective the 
WiPe difference aPong WKese Seriods Pakes no real difference.µ Id. at 255–56 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority did not disagree with Breyer’s assessment 
of economic rationality, but simply stated that it was deferring to Congress 
on the matter. Id. at 207 n.15. At the same time, extending the copyright term 
by WwenWy years Pakes iW significanWly Karder Ior auWKors Wo engage wiWK and 
make use of works that would otherwise have fallen into the public domain. 
See 1ƓƗƚ WƓƗƜơƢƝƑƙ 1ƓƢƏƜƓƚŽ &ƝƞƧƠƗƕƖƢ
ơ 3ƏƠƏƒƝƦ 175 (2008). Such 
transfers of cultural power to incumbent actors that do not directly incentivize 
further creativity are likely to undermine the fair value of the cultural liberties.
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First, Congress could reform damages provisions of copyright 
law, eliminating statutory damages for copyright infringement 
involving appropriation art.200 At the same time, Congress could 
direct courts not to award attorneys’ fees to successful copyright 
SlainWiffs in cases inYolYing aSSroSriaWion arW and could encourage 
artists to assert fair use rights by establishing a presumption that 
courts will award costs and attorney’s fees to appropriation artists 
who successfully assert fair use as a defense.201 This reform strategy 
would not alter which exclusive rights accrue to copyright holders 
under the Copyright Act, or even change what uses count as “fair 
use,” but would aim to make it less risky for non-incumbent 
creators to assert fair use rights and so to limit the degree to which 
incumbent creators can make use of the fact-sensitivity of fair use 
determinations to control appropriation art.
Second, Congress could institute compulsory licensing for 
appropriation art, modeled on existing compulsory licenses, such 
as compulsory licenses for making recordings of nondramatic 
musical compositions.202 Under such a program, artists like Quinn 
would retain an exclusive right to create derivative works but, when 
copyright owners were unwilling to bargain for a license or demanded 
unreasonably high licensing fees, creators of appropriation art like 
Morgan could obtain a license at a rate set by the Copyright Royalty 
Board, just as musicians can now obtain a compulsory license to 
create a “cover” of a song when a composer refuses to negotiate.203 
In combination with this compulsory licensing scheme, Congress 
could institute a system of progressive taxation and wealth transfers 
Wo WKe Soor Wo ensure WKaW Soor creaWors are noW financially e[cluded 
from the possibility of purchasing compulsory licenses.204 This 
strategy would leave incumbent creators with exclusive rights to 
produce derivative works but would limit their discretionary control 
to deny licenses. Artists like Quinn would receive compensation 
for appropriation art that made use of their copyrighted work but 
could not refuse to grant licenses on the grounds that they dislike 
the aesthetic qualities of an appropriative work.
200 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2017); see 1ƓƢƏƜƓƚ, supra note 199, at 192–93.
201 17 U.S.C. § 505; see Feder, Fountain & Stewart, supra note 195, at 311.
202 17 U.S.C. § 115; see FƗơƖƓƠ, supra note 13, at 252–58.
203 See 17 U.S.C. § 115.; 8ſSſ &ƝƞƧƠƗƕƖƢ 2ƔƔƗƑƓŽ &ƝƛƞƣƚơƝƠƧ LƗƑƓƜơƓ 
ƔƝƠ MƏƙƗƜƕ ƏƜƒ DƗơƢƠƗƐƣƢƗƜƕ 3ƖƝƜƝƠƓƑƝƠƒơ (2018), https://www.
copyright.gov/circs/circ73.pdf; see also FƗơƖƓƠ, supra note 13, at 41.
204 See supra notes 184–87.
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Third, federal courts could amend their interpretations of 
fair use to more clearly and explicitly privilege appropriation art. 
WKile WKe sWaWuWory codificaWion oI Iairuse docWrine lisWs Iour IacWors 
for courts to evaluate when determining whether a use is “fair,” this 
determination often boils down to the question of whether a use is 
“transformative.”205 Courts presently adopt a range of interpretations 
of transformativeness, but they could adopt a uniform interpretation 
according to which a work is transformative “if it either constitute[s] or 
facilitate[s] creative engagement with intellectual products.”206 This 
strategy, which would not require legislative action, would narrow 
the scope of the copyright entitlement enjoyed by incumbent creators 
by restricting copyright holders’ rights to control the preparation of 
derivative works, eliminating the need for appropriation artists to 
secure licenses to ensure that their work is non-infringing.207 The 
class of incumbent creators would lose the ability to exercise the 
sort of control that Quinn seeks over Morgan’s work.
Fourth, state legislatures and insurance commissions could 
make it easier to insure against awards of damages in copyright 
lawsuits, requiring, for instance, that liability insurance provided 
through homeowners’ and renters’ policies cover damages awards for 
copyright infringement when an infringing work is creative.208 At the 
205 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2017); see &aPSbell Y. AcuffRose Music ,nc.  8.S.  
579 (1994).
206 William W. Fisher III, How to Handle Appropriation Art, in Fisher et al., supra 
note 195, at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fisher, supra 
note 4, at 1768); see also Rebecca Tushnet, /eJal )ictions &oSyriJht, )an )iction, 
and a New Common Law, 17 LƝƧſ LſAſ EƜƢſ LſJſ 651, 654 (1997) (arguing 
WKaW ´Ian ficWionµ sKould be uniIorPly SroWecWed as Iair use ´because iW giYes 
authors and readers meaning and enjoyment, allowing them to participate 
in the production of culture without hurting the legitimate interests of the 
copyright holder”).
207 17 U.S.C. § 106 ; see Tushnet, supra note 206.
208 See Evaluating Homeowners and Renters Insurance Policies, DƗƕƗƢƏƚ MƓƒƗƏ 
LƏƥ 3ƠƝƘƓƑƢ, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/evaluating-homeowners-
and-renters-insurance-policies (last updated 2014) (surveying common 
homeowners insurance policies and concluding that “copyright [and] trademark 
infringement . . . do not appear to fall within most homeowners insurance 
Solicy definiWions and iW is WKereIore unlikely WKaW your KoPeowners insurance 
will cover you if you are sued for copyright or trademark infringement.”); cf. 
Myoda Comput. Ctr. v. Am. Family Mut., 909 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2009) (enforcing a commercial insurance policy that expressly provided for 
coverage of injury arising out of “infringement of copyright, title, or slogan”); 
Christopher French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage Is Not Available 
or Allowed for Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 +ƏơƢƗƜƕơ %ƣơſ LſJſ 65, 69 n.20 
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same time, state bars could relax rules restricting who can practice 
law, increasing the supply of lawyers and thereby decreasing the 
cost of retaining counsel to defend against copyright infringement 
lawsuits.209 This set of reforms would not involve any changes to 
title 17 of the United States Code but would give a group of repeat 
Slayers in WKe courWs i.e. insurance coPSanies a sWrong financial 
incentive to litigate fair use cases and advocate for clearer judicial 
sWaWePenWs oI wKicK uses are Iair. ,W would also like WKe firsW seW oI 
reforms, make it less risky for non-incumbent creators to assert fair 
use rights, limiting the ability of artists like Quinn to restrict the 
contributions of artists like Morgan to our shared culture.
Fifth, Congress could eliminate copyright and replace it 
wiWK a sysWeP coPbining financial Sri]es Ior arWisWs auWKors and 
musicians who make popular works of art with grants for artists, 
authors, and musicians administered by the National Endowment 
for the Arts and National Endowment for the Humanities.210 This 
more radical reform would eliminate the risk of incumbent creators 
controlling what later creations can enter culture by bringing all 
creative works into the public domain and incentivizing the creation 
of such goods through direct payments from the government rather 
than by granting limited-term monopolies.
7Ke fiYe reIorPs surYeyed Kere illusWraWe WKe range oI legal 
domains involved in respecting semiotic justice.211 Any of a number 
of highly divergent, even orthogonal, reform strategies can bring the 
overall constitutional order more closely into conformity with the 
requirement to guarantee the fair value of the cultural liberties.
,n eYaluaWing WKe differenW reIorP sWraWegies WKaW could address 
the failure of semiotic justice in cases of appropriation art, one must 
keep in mind the role that copyright law serves in a given legal order. 
(collecting cases where liability insurance policies for advertising injury 
provided coverage for copyright infringement).
209 See WƗƚƚƗƏƛ Dſ +ƓƜƒƓƠơƝƜŽ LƓƕƏƚ MƏƠƙƓƢ LƏƜƒơƑƏƞƓ RƓƞƝƠƢƌ 
&ƝƛƛƗơơƗƝƜƓƒ ƐƧ ƢƖƓ SƢƏƢƓ %ƏƠ ƝƔ &ƏƚƗƔƝƠƜƗƏ 19–20, 27–28 (2018), 
http://board.calbar.ca.gov/docs/agendaItem/Public/agendaitem1000022382.
pdf.
210 See FƗơƖƓƠ, supra note 13, at 200–03 (proposing an alternative compensation 
system to replace copyright protection for many cinematic and musical 
creations).
211 Fully assessing reform strategies requires considering not only how copyright 
law intersects with other areas of law but also how copyright law intersects 
wiWK PaWerial affordances and consWrainWs on creaWiYiWy. For insWance 
technologies that make it easier to create high quality sound recordings in a 
garage may change the relationship between copyright law and creativity.
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If part of copyright law’s function is to make it easier for citizens 
who are not wealthy to make a living as creative artists by enabling 
them to monetize their artistic, musical, literary, and cinematic 
creations,212 restricting the rights accorded to copyright holders too 
severely might itself run afoul of semiotic justice. Because privileging 
creaWiYe coSying as a Iair use is unlikely Wo significanWly affecW WKe 
economic incentives to create new works,213 WKe firsW Iour sWraWegies 
surYeyed Kere³eacK oI wKicK would Parginally reduce WKe SrofiWs 
available to copyright holders—could, individually or together, 
satisfy the requirements of semiotic justice. However, if restricting 
the ability of creators like Quinn to extract statutory damages and 
attorneys’ fees for unauthorized creative uses of their art reduced 
incentives to create too substantially, semiotic justice might require 
that the system of copyright be replaced by or supplemented with an 
alWernaWiYe coPSensaWion sysWeP oI WKe sorW enWerWained in WKe fiIWK 
reform strategy.214
212 See Matthew Barblan, Copyright as a Platform for Artistic and Creative Freedom, 23 
GƓƝſ MƏơƝƜ Lſ RƓƤſ 793, 800 (2016). But see Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Jiayang 
Sun & Yiying Fan, Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis 
of &oSyriJht·s %oXnty, 62 VƏƜƒſ Lſ RƓƤſ 1669, 1672 (2009) (empirical study 
finding WKaW greaWer SroWecWions Ior coSyrigKW do noW lead creaWors Wo Sroduce 
more work but rather “the historic growth in new copyrighted works is largely 
a function of population”); Ruth Towse, &oSyriJht and Artists A 9ieZ from 
Cultural Economics, 20 Jſ EƑƝƜſ SƣƠƤơſ 567, 578 (2006) (surveying empirical 
sWudies and finding WKaW ´WKe Pain benefiWs oI coSyrigKW are enMoyed by WKe 
‘humdrum’ side of the cultural industries rather than the creators and . . . 
the distributions of royalties to artists other than the top few stars show how 
relatively little they get through the copyright system”).
213 See Tushnet, supra note 113, at 541.
214 It might be objected to my application of semiotic justice to copyright 
that making it harder for artists to create appropriation art would actually 
encourage more artistic creativity, because artists who cannot rely on creative 
copying will instead come up with their own, more original creations. See 
Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 +ƏƠƤſ Lſ RƓƤſ 1333, 
1336 (2015). This objection relies on an empirical claim about the nature 
of creativity and the relationship between appropriation art and originality 
which some prominent copyright scholars reject. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 
4, at 1769 (arguing that privileging creative copying as fair use would “create 
more opportunities for Americans to become actively involved in shaping 
their culture”). Evaluating this empirical debate is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Setting aside the empirical question, democratic control of culture is 
not merely about how much total creativity is present in a culture. Democratic 
control of culture requires that every citizen have an equal opportunity to 
help shape the culture. Even if Fishman’s claim is correct—if some subset of 
citizens is most likely to contribute to the culture through appropriation art or 
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Considering the application of semiotic justice to 
aSSroSriaWion arW KelSs Wo sKow WKaW sePioWic MusWice enWails differenW 
legal reforms than does Rawls’s proviso of the fair value of the equal 
political liberties. Rawls’s proviso might entail that all citizens must 
have a fair equal opportunity to create appropriative art that engages 
in social and political commentary,215 but semiotic justice suggests 
that all contributions to culture should enjoy this protection in 
order to ensure that all citizens can participate in the collective 
articulation and working-out of views about what the good life and 
a good culture consist in. 
C. Businesses’ Right to Refuse Service
7Ke significance oI sePioWic MusWice coPes inWo eYen clearer 
relief if one considers not an area of law explicitly concerned with 
culture and creativity, like copyright, but an area of private law that 
does not, on its face, aim to regulate cultural participation, such as 
property law. Consider the following cases concerning the power of 
business to choose their customers and control their premises:
A. Neha, the sole proprietor of an art supply 
shop, refuses to sell high quality paints and canvases 
Wo Juan because sKe WKinks WKaW Juan·s arW ´ e[ePSlifies 
one of the most nihilistic styles in contemporary art.”
B. Khanhvy, a grocer, refuses to sell cheese to 
George because George has a tattoo of a snake on his 
neck, which Khanhvy dislikes.
C. The Green Hill Apartment Complex, Inc., 
refuses to allow the Green Hill Tenants’ Association 
to distribute its monthly newsletter (which is often 
critical of the Green Hill Apartment Complex’s 
management) by slipping the newsletter under 
tenants’ doors.216
Ian ficWion³ resSecWing WKese PePbers oI WKe coPPuniWy as eTual SarWiciSanWs 
in the culture may require implementing one or more of the reform strategies 
discussed above.
215 See &Əơơ Rſ SƣƜơƢƓƗƜŽ DƓƛƝƑƠƏƑƧ ƏƜƒ ƢƖƓ 3ƠƝƐƚƓƛ ƝƔ FƠƓƓ SƞƓƓƑƖ 
152 (1993) (suggesting that “art and literature that have the characteristics 
of social commentary” deserve heightened protection under the First 
Amendment).
216 This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden 
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D. The East Valley Feminist Reading Group 
PeeWs weekly aW JaYaSWoS &offee SKoS Wo discuss 
works of feminist theory. Some of their discussions 
involve explicit descriptions of sexual activity. The 
JavaStop manager tells the reading group that they 
are no longer welcome to meet at JavaStop because 
JavaStop management is “uncomfortable” with their 
discussions and tells them that if they return to 
JavaStop he will call the police.
E. Cakemaster, LLC refuses to sell a wedding 
cake to Tina and Lisa because Cakemaster “doesn’t 
do same sex wedding cakes.”217
7Ke firsW Iour oI WKese cases inYolYe WKe WySically absoluWe 
right of businesses (other than innkeepers and common carriers) to 
choose their customers, provided that they do not run afoul of civil 
rights statutes.218 In almost all jurisdictions in the United States, 
businesses can arbitrarily exclude members of the public, refusing to 
allow them to engage in speech on the premises of the business and 
refusing to sell them goods or services, provided that the exclusion 
is noW based on one oI seYeral grounds sSecifically Sroscribed in a 
public accommodation statute (such as race, gender, age, sexual 
orientation, marital status, and employment by the military).219 
7Ke fiIWK case reSresenWs a broader asserWion oI Iree sSeecK rigKWs 
by businesses, asserting a right to refuse service to customers even 
wKen WKaW rigKW coPes inWo conÁicW wiWK WKe reTuirePenWs oI ciYil 
rights statutes.220 Even scholars who think that businesses should 
not be able to claim exceptions from generally applicable anti-
discrimination laws often think that businesses should have a right to 
*ateZay 7enants Ass·n, 29 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
217 This case is abstracted from the facts of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
5iJhts &omm·n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
218 See Joseph William Singer, No 5iJht to ([clXde PXblic Accommodations and PriYate 
Property, 90 1ƥſ 8ſ Lſ RƓƤſ 1283, 1291 (1996).
219 Id. at 1290–91. California provides a notable exception. See infra note 231.
220 Such a right was asserted by the petitioner in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 
S. &W. aW . 7Ke SuSrePe &ourW decided in IaYor oI WKe SlainWiff on narrow 
grounds without reaching the issue of whether the free speech rights of 
businesses can justify exemptions from generally applicable antidiscrimination 
laws. See id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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arbitrarily refuse service because conferring such a right of arbitrary 
refusal on business owners advances the value of autonomy and 
makes business owners less likely to be alienated from their work.221
However, these cases present prima facie evidence of a failure 
of semiotic justice. They do so not as isolated cases, but as instances 
of a broader pattern. Conferring a right of arbitrary exclusion on 
business owners grants owners of capital greater power than 
non-owners of capital to control the shape of our shared culture. 
Conferring a right on art shop proprietors to marginally discourage 
artists whose style they do not like from making art, allowing small 
business owners to marginally discourage individuals from getting 
tattoos or wearing certain styles of clothes or encourage particular 
grooming habits, and enabling apartment building owners to 
regulate the sort of cultural communication that tenants engage in 
with one another in the hallways of apartment buildings all grant 
business owners as a class disproportionate power to control who 
can contribute to culture and how they can do so.222 This represents 
a failure of constitutional legitimacy in that the legal order confers 
on owners of capital the ability to transform the material resources 
that they control into cultural clout. When the legal system endorses 
the free speech rights of petit bourgeois small business owners to 
arbitrarily refuse service, it makes formal rights of free speech less 
Yaluable Ior WKe resW oI us wKen we wisK Wo inÁuence WKe sKaSe oI 
our shared culture.223
7Ke YiolaWion oI sePioWic MusWice reSresenWed by WKe fiYe 
scenarios described above might be partially remedied by any of the 
following three reform strategies:
First, states could adopt expansive public accommodations 
statutes that deny businesses the right to arbitrarily refuse service.224 
Among American jurisdictions, California stands out for its broad 
Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibits all arbitrary discrimination 
221 See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Commercial Complicity 41–42 (Feb. 18, 2018) 
unSublisKed PanuscriSW on file wiWK auWKor.
222 A differenW case³and one WKaW is less obYious IroP WKe sWandSoinW oI sePioWic 
justice—would be presented if the businesses described here sought to exclude 
customers not because of the preferences of the owners of the business, but 
because WKe businesses were seeking Wo Pa[iPi]e SrofiWs and resSonded Wo 
the wishes of other customers. See supra Part II.A.3.
223 See supra notes 107–14 and accompanying text.
224 See Singer, supra note 218, at 1448 (arguing that a right of access should be 
extended to all places open to the public).
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by “all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”225 
While the scope of the Unruh Civil Rights Act’s protections has 
been curtailed by courts in the past thirty years,226 California’s 
public accommodation law continues to prohibit the exclusion of 
individuals from businesses for arbitrary reasons.227 California courts 
could reinvigorate the statutory right of access to public businesses, 
barring businesses from refusing to sell to customers whose style, 
aesthetic sensibility, occupation, or politics they dislike,228 and state 
legislatures and municipal governments in other jurisdictions could 
adopt California’s broad statutory language guaranteeing individuals 
a right to be free from arbitrary discrimination by businesses. This 
reform would leave in place the economic inequalities that allow 
225 Unruh Civil Rights Act, &Əƚſ &ƗƤſ &ƝƒƓ § 51(b) (Deering 2019) (“All persons 
within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what 
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical 
condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, 
primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 
establishments of every kind whatsoever.”); see In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 995 
(Cal. 1970) (holding that Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits “all arbitrary 
discrimination by a business enterprise”); Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 
P.2d 115, 120,122 (Cal. 1982) (noting that Unruh Civil Rights Act’s list of 
protected categories, such as sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, and national 
origin, is illustrative rather than restrictive).
226 See Harris v. Capital Growth Inv’rs XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 880–83 (Cal. 1991) 
(narrowing the concept of arbitrary discrimination under the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act “to discrimination based on personal characteristics similar to 
WKe sWaWuWory classificaWions oI race se[ religion eWc.µ sucK as ´a Serson·s 
geographical origin, physical attributes, and personal beliefs” but not including 
´financial or econoPic sWaWusµ see also Sande L. Buhai, One Hundred Years of 
(TXality 6aYinJ &alifornia·s 6tatXtory %an on Arbitrary Discrimination by %Xsinesses, 
36 8ſ SſFſ Lſ RƓƤſ 109, 126–30 (2001) (arguing that recent decisions of lower 
courWs in &aliIornia KaYe liPiWed WKe broad SroWecWions afforded by WKe 8nruK 
Civil Rights Act).
227 Cox, 474 P.2d at 994–95, 1001 (business may not exclude a customer because 
it dislikes the customer’s hair or unconventional clothing); see Harris, 805 P.2d 
at 879 (declining to overrule Cox); see Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. 
Supp. 2d. 1022, 1029–32 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that Cox remains good law 
in spite of its narrowing in Harris).
228 See Buhai, supra noWe  aW  ² ´>&@ourWs sKould find a way Wo 
construe the Unruh Act to protect the rights of all persons to participate in 
a society free from arbitrary discrimination.”); see also id. at 140–41 (arguing 
that courts should interpret Harris as subjecting discrimination on the basis 
of “personal characteristics” to heightened scrutiny and requiring “legitimate 
business reasons” for any discrimination other than on the basis of personal 
characteristics).
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some people to own capital while others do not—which Rawls’s 
difference SrinciSle Pay SerPiW229—but would interrupt the link 
beWween econoPic Sower and culWural inÁuence WKaW coPes IroP an 
arbitrary right to exclude, reasserting democratic control over the 
grounds on which market relationships can be refused. 
Second, state and federal courts could expansively interpret 
constitutional guarantees of free speech to restrict the judicial 
enforcement of private property rights. This strategy would pare 
down the bundle of rights held by property owners,230 restricting 
their ability to exclude individuals from speaking and being present 
in places open to the public.231 Some state constitutions contain 
free speech provisions that encompass restrictions on free speech 
by private parties, as well as the state.232 While state courts have 
often interpreted such rights of free speech against private parties 
narrowly,233 they could limit the ability of capital owners to exercise 
229 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 138–39.
230 For a discussion of the bundle theory of property rights, see, for example, 
Shane Nicholas Glackin, %acN to %Xndles DeÁatinJ ProSerty 5iJhts, AJain, 20 
LƓƕƏƚ 7ƖƓƝƠƧ    deIending a deÁaWionary WKeory oI SroSerWy as 
a bundle of rights); Hugh Breakey, Property, ,ƜƢƓƠƜƓƢ EƜƑƧƑƚƝƞƓƒƗƏ ƝƔ 
3ƖƗƚƝơƝƞƖƧŽ https://www.iep.utm.edu/prop-con/ (last visited Sept. 13, 
2018) (describing the bundle theory of property rights).
231 See, e.g. Lloyd &orS. Y. 7anner  8.S.    finding WKaW 
privately owned shopping center was entitled to exclude pamphleteers from 
its premises).
232 &Əƚſ &ƝƜơƢſ art. I, § 2(a) (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish 
his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this 
right.”); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979) 
(applying the California Constitution’s free speech provision to a privately-
owned shopping center), aff ·d 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see Golden Gateway Ctr. 
v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n., 29 P.3d 797, 826 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he original state free speech clause, as originally enacted 
and as it appears today . . . grants a right of free speech running against 
private parties as well as state actors”). In 2001, a plurality of the California 
Supreme Court sought to impose a state action requirement on the California 
Constitution’s free speech clause. Golden Gateway Ctr., 29 P.3d at 810–11. 
However, a majority of the court has never adopted a state action requirement. 
Subsequent opinions have applied the California Constitution’s free speech 
right to privately owned retail establishments without raising the question 
of state action. See Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 172 
P.3d 742, 743 (Cal. 2007) (holding the California Constitution’s free speech 
rights includes the right to urge customers to boycott a store located in a 
privately-owned mall). 
233 See Golden Gateway Ctr., 29 P.3d at 810 (holding a tenants’ association has no 
right under article I, section 2 of the California Constitution to distribute its 
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control over the shared space of culture by adopting more expansive 
interpretations, holding, for instance, that the same free speech 
rights that restrict the ability of publicly owned commercial entities 
to exclude individuals also restrict the judicial enforcement of private 
property rights by all businesses open to the public.234 Courts in 
jurisdictions that lack constitutional free speech guarantees that 
directly apply to private parties could achieve the same outcome by 
expanding 6helley Y .raemer’s conclusion that judicial enforcement of 
racially restrictive covenants constitutes state action to encompass 
all judicial enforcement of rights in real property.235 This reform 
strategy would leave in place the economic inequalities that gave 
rise Wo WKe YiolaWion oI sePioWic MusWice in WKe fiYe cases described 
above but would seek to take democratic control of the grounds 
on which police and courts can be asked to enforce prohibitions on 
trespassing.
Third, state or federal governments could expropriate some 
or all capital from private individuals and corporations, adopting an 
economic system of liberal socialism.236 This strategy would require a 
radical reWKinking oI consWiWuWional resWricWions on Wakings sSecifically 
newsletter by slipping it under tenants’ doors in a large apartment complex); 
Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 
290 P.3d 1116, 1120 (Cal. 2012) (restricting the free speech right recognized 
by Pruneyard to the common areas of large shopping centers where shoppers 
are invited “to stop and linger and to leisurely congregate for purposes of 
relaxation and conversation”).
234 See ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that publicly-owned pedestrian mall constitutes a public forum for 
First Amendment purposes); see also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 
U.S. 715, 719, 723–24 (1961) (holding that Equal Protection Clause applies 
to a private business leasing public property); Mark Cordes, Property and the 
First Amendment, 31 8ſ RƗƑƖſ Lſ RƓƤſ 1, 27 (1997); cf. Balkin, supra note 4, at 
3 (“Freedom of speech is rapidly becoming the key site for struggles over the 
legal and constitutional protection of capital in the information age.”).
235 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). In the federal courts, adopting 
this strategy would require overruling Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, which held that 
protesters were not entitled to exercise free speech rights guaranteed by the 
First Amendment on the property of a privately owned shopping center, 407 
U.S. 551, 562–63 (1972), and a return to the constitutional jurisprudence of 
Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), 
and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
236 See DƏƤƗƒ SƑƖƥƓƗƑƙƏƠƢŽ AƕƏƗƜơƢ &ƏƞƗƢƏƚƗơƛ 282–92 (1993); see 
also RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 138 (describing liberal socialism and property 
owning democracy as the two types of economic system that might satisfy the 
requirements of justice as fairness).
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and, more generally, of the state’s role in the market.237 8nlike WKe firsW 
two strategies, this strategy of state socialism could leave free speech 
and public accommodation law unchanged. By limiting the capacity 
of individuals and classes to amass economic control of institutions 
that provide opportunities for citizens to contest shared conceptions 
of the good, restricting private ownership of capital would interrupt 
the entrenchment of economic and cultural power that threatens 
to rob the cultural liberties of their fair value.238 To satisfy semiotic 
justice, such public control of capital would need to be connected 
Wo effecWiYely IuncWioning SoliWical sysWePs oI dePocraWic conWrol 
in order to prevent political elites from simply taking over control 
from economic elites.239 If, as some cultural theorists argue, a 
psychological tendency to defer to owners is so bound up with 
the history of private property that such deference is inextricable 
from the idea of property,240 this strategy of liberal socialism might 
provide the only reform agenda that can fully satisfy the demands of 
semiotic justice.
The wide range of possible reform strategies—from 
237 See 8ſSſ &ƝƜơƢſ amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”). Such a rethinking might involve 
a radical expansion of the public trust doctrine, treating capital as a public 
resource held in trust by the government for the people, such that any legal 
framework that the state adopts allocating capital to private individuals may 
subsequently be rescinded. Cf. Ill. Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 
(1892) (holding the state of Illinois lacked authority to transfer title to lands 
under Lake Michigan held in public trust as navigable waters); Borough of 
Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 53–54 (N.J. 1972) 
(holding modern changes in use of tidelands justify expanding the historical 
public trust doctrine).
238 This is not to suggest that minority cultures cannot develop in an illegitimate 
political order. See Stuart Hall, Notes on DeconstrXctinJ ´the PoSXlarµ, in 
&ƣƚƢƣƠƏƚ 7ƖƓƝƠƧ ƏƜƒ 3ƝƞƣƚƏƠ &ƣƚƢƣƠƓƌ A RƓƏƒƓƠ 442, 446–48 
(John Storey ed., 2d ed., 1998). What is compromised is not the possibility 
of countercultures but the realization of equality. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking 
to the %ottom &ritical /eJal 6tXdies and 5eSarations, 22 +ƏƠƤſ &ƗƤſ RƢơſ&ƗƤſ 
LƗƐƓƠƢƗƓơ Lſ RƓƤſ 323, 335 (1987).
239 See David Beetham, Beyond Liberal Democracy, 18 SƝƑƗƏƚƗơƢ RƓƕſ 190, 203–05 
(1981); see also Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 +ƏƠƤſ Lſ RƓƤſ 781, 787 
(1987) (“[T]he state might act wrongfully, and thereby restrict or impoverish 
rather than enhance public debate . . . but . . . this same danger is presented 
by all social institutions, private or public, and that there is no reason for 
presuming that the state will be more likely to exercise its power to distort 
public debate than would any other institution.”).
240 See generally David Graeber, Manners, Deference, and Private Property in Early 
Modern Europe, 39 &Ɲƛƞſ SƢƣƒſ SƝƑǋƧ ż +ƗơƢſ 694 (1997).
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expanding anti-discrimination laws, to narrowing the scope of 
private rights conferred by property ownership, to adopting a socialist 
organization of the economy—illustrates the range of options open 
to a community that wishes to make its constitution legitimate. As 
in the cases of #OscarsSoWhite and appropriation art, evaluating 
these reform strategies requires considering the relationship 
between the formal equal basic liberties and the fair value of the 
cultural liberties. Restrictions on political campaign expenditures 
constitute, in some respect, a restriction on formal liberty of speech 
but preserve the value of the right to engage in political speech 
for all citizens.241 SiPilarly WKe firsW and second reIorPs discussed 
here restrict the formal speech rights and associational rights of 
business owners in order to promote the fair value of the right to 
participate in cultural expression. The third reform strategy is the 
most economically radical of the three, but it provides a mechanism 
by which a state could enhance the fair value of the cultural liberties 
without curtailing formal free speech rights. Fully assessing these 
reIorPs would reTuire eYaluaWing WKe ways in wKicK WKe differenW 
formal and substantive liberties promote the exercise of the two 
moral powers.242
It may be objected to semiotic justice that the logic that 
PoWiYaWes WKe firsW Wwo reIorP SroSosals discussed Kere WKreaWens 
to undermine the state action doctrine of American constitutional 
law,243 for it is not just business owners who turn economic resources 
into cultural clout. What about owners of large houses who regularly 
KosW liWerary salons inYiWing Iriends and inÁuenWial auWKors Wo gaWKer 
for dinner? Does conferring the right on homeowners to exclude 
unwanted guests impermissibly grant a cultural power to a particular 
class (homeowners) that other citizens are denied?244 I agree that 
241 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 6, at 361.
242 See RƏƥƚơ, supra note 4, at 149–50.
243 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 923 (1982). See generally Terri 
Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 Lſ ż SƝƑſ ,ƜƟƣƗƠƧ 
273 (2010) (providing a historical survey of the state action doctrine in U.S. 
courts).
244 See LƏƣƠƓƜƑƓ 7ƠƗƐƓŽ Ƅ AƛƓƠƗƑƏƜ &ƝƜơƢƗƢƣƢƗƝƜƏƚ LƏƥ 1691 (2d ed. 
1988) (“[E]xempting private action from the reach of the Constitution’s 
prohibitions . . . stops the Constitution short of preempting individual 
liberty—of denying to individuals the freedom to make certain choices . . . . 
Such freedom is basic under any conception of liberty, but it would be lost if 
individuals had to conform their conduct to the Constitution’s demands.”); 
Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer Notes for a 5eYised 2Sinion, 110 8ſ 3Əſ Lſ 
RƓƤſ 473, 503–04 (1962).
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the case of the salon host has the same structure as the case of the 
businesses arbitrarily excluding customers. If a state’s constitutional 
order lets some citizens control much larger residences than others, 
and if citizens can convert such residential resources into cultural 
capital, the guarantee of the fair value of the cultural liberties may 
be violated. This is not to suggest that the remedy is for the police 
to refuse to help homeowners keep unwanted guests out of dinner 
parties. Assessing what to do requires balancing the formal rights 
guaranWeed by WKe firsW SrinciSle oI MusWice WogeWKer wiWK WKe Iair 
value of the political and cultural liberties. If ensuring access to the 
scheme of equal basic liberties to all citizens requires conferring the 
right to exclude unwanted guests from dinner parties on bigoted 
private individuals, then other features of the constitutional order 
may need to give way.245 For instance, inequalities in wealth that 
enable some individuals to control much larger residential spaces 
than others may be impermissible under semiotic justice. This 
e[aPSle illusWraWes WKe significance oI eleYaWing WKe Iair Yalue oI WKe 
cultural liberties to the level of the constitutional essentials. The 
question of whether homeowners can exclude unwanted guests is 
not settled by lexical priority of the formal liberty of freedom of 
association above the fair equality of opportunity; rather, we must 
balance competing constitutional rights to determine whether 
homeowners may legitimately claim such a power.246
The problem of businesses’ abilities to arbitrarily exclude 
highlights the divergence of semiotic justice from Rawls’s proviso of 
the fair value of the political liberties. While Rawls’s proviso might 
require the expansion of rights to engage in political protests and 
to petition on private property, guaranteeing the fair value of the 
cultural liberties requires denying owners of capital the power to 
control who contributes to our shared culture.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that liberal theorists should endorse 
245 See Mattias Kumm, Who Is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as 
Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GƓƠƛƏƜ LſJſ 341, 362–63 
(2006) (arguing that “the application of constitutional rights to the private 
context does not undermine an important point of rights, which is to provide 
individuals with a private sphere within which they need not be concerned 
with being held publicly accountable”).
246 ,n WKis resSecW incorSoraWing Iair Yalue guaranWees inWo WKe firsW SrinciSle oI 
MusWice liPiWs WKe legal significance oI WKe sWaWe acWion docWrine and SusKes 
toward the full constitutionalization of private law. See id. at 368–69.
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a constitutional guarantee of the fair value of the political liberties 
given their existing commitments to ensuring that individuals can 
develop and pursue their own conceptions of the good life. The cases 
described in Part III represent failures of the fair value of the cultural 
liberties. They also represent failures of citizens to reciprocally share 
WKe burdens and benefiWs oI liYing WogeWKer in a coPPuniWy. ,n WKe 
#OscarsSoWhite case, minority actors are treated as less than full 
contributors to elite cinematic culture. In the appropriation art case, 
new entrants to the art scene are treated as less entitled to mold 
the culture than are incumbent artists. In the cases of businesses 
refusing services and excluding speakers, members of the bourgeoisie 
are granted the entitlement to use material resources that other 
economic classes lack to impose their idea of what our shared culture 
should look like. Remedying this failure of reciprocity is necessary if 
we wish to build a legitimate constitutional order. 
The discussion of the reforms that might help to bring about 
semiotic justice suggests that guaranteeing the fair value of the 
cultural liberties often requires the same sorts of reforms required 
by Rawls’s proviso of the fair value of the equal political liberties but 
also often requires more. Depending on how we choose to resolve 
WKe conÁicW beWween IorPal liberWies oI Iree sSeecK and associaWion 
and the fair value of the cultural liberties, semiotic justice may 
require radical political and legal reforms, ranging from judicial 
PodificaWions oI coSyrigKW and SroSerWy law Wo legislaWiYe reYaPSing 
of our political and economic order. Because this article is concerned 
with articulating the normative reform agenda of semiotic justice, 
a consideration of the political likelihood and workability of the 
reforms suggested here is beyond the present scope. 
However, this exploration of the reforms necessary to 
guarantee the fair value of the cultural liberties suggests that it may 
be PucK Pore diűculW Wo acKieYe a legiWiPaWe consWiWuWion WKan 
we might previously have thought. Creating a constitutional order 
that embodies reciprocal respect among all citizens requires that 
we quarantine those economic and social inequalities authorized by 
the constitution to prevent them from undermining the democratic 
control of both culture and politics, a task that may seem impossible 
or nearly so in our present political moment. Building a legitimate 
constitution requires that we all come to see one another as “co-
worker[s] in the kingdom of culture” and that our laws and 
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institutions embody this respect.247
247 Dƣ %ƝƗơ, supra note 2.
